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CASE COMMENTS

CASE COMMENTS
COPYRIGHTS--DUTY OF ONE OWNER To ACCOUNT TO CO-OWNER FOR
PROFITS FROM USE AND LICENSING OF COPYRIGHT. [New York]

In the past four decades, there have been many new developments
in those fields of enterprise affected by copyrights. Radio, motion pictures, offset methods of printing, microfilming, new and improved
methods of recording and reproducing phonograph records, comic
strips, and featured columns have all been developed, along with the
organizations which exploit them, such as press associations, broadcasting networks,, the motion picture and so-called "juke box" industries, feature syndicates, and many others. Various associations have
been organized to protect against the illegal exploitation of copyrights, the most outstanding of which is the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers. The basic American copyright law1
was, with few amendments, 39 years old before its repeal in 1947. As a
result of the lag in the development of this branch of the law, the increasingly complex systems built up to take advantage of the abovementioned innovations had become entangled in outmoded rules which
had failed to keep abreast of the times, much as the automobile became entangled in "horse and buggy" law. Men dealing in this field
were forced to take actions with ignorance as to their legal consequences-in fact, as to their very legality. Courts were forced to legislate judilially in order to fill in "the open spaces in the law," 2 with
the result, in many instances, of a lack of uniformity in a field where,
because of its national and even international scope, uniformity was
and is a necessity. With an eye to correcting this anachronism, Congress has recently passed a new copyright law,3 supplanting entirely
the old tatute and its amendments.
However, in enacting the new statute, Congress failed to provide
for a phase of copyright law which seems to be growing in importance
because of the pyramiding of interests in modem exploitation methods:
the question of whether one owner of a copyright must account to his
co-owner for the profits he derives from the use and licensing of the
copyright. One of the few direct holdings on the subject is the early
decision of Carter v. Bailey.4 There, two partners in a book publish135 Stat. 1o75 (i9og).
2Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 113.
361 Stat. 652, 17 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-32, ioi-ii6, 201-215 (1947).
'64 Me. 458, 18 Am. Rep. 273 (1874).
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ing business dissolved the partnership, agreeing that all plates and
copyrights should belong to them as "individuals, co-owners, co-tenants, and tenants in common." One partner later sold all of the plates
to a third party, who had knowledge of the above agreement. The latter published and sold books from the plates, whereupon the other
partner sued him for an accounting for the profits in this enterprise.
The court, basing its decision on a strict analogy to patent law, 5 held
that the defendant was not liable for an accounting.
When the recent case of Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc. v. Miller Music,
Inc.6 came before the New York courts, this seventy-year old precedent
and its reasoniog still stood as an obstacle to accounting rights as between co-owners of a copyright. In this case it appeared that two men
had written a song and copyrighted it in 1913. One author assigned
his .interest to the present plaintiff, and the other assigned his interest
to the present defendant. Plaintiff renewed the copyright in its own
name in 1940, and it was conceded that defendant had the same interest

in the new copyright as it had in the old.7 A motion picture company,
seeking a license to use the song, contacted both assignees. Plaintiff
offered the license for $iooo, but while this offer was pending, defendant sold the license for $200. Plaintiff then sued for an accounting of
the profits and for damages for the wasting of the copyrighted property,
attempting to avoid the unfavorable patent-law analogy by arguing
that the renewed copyright was held by plaintiff as a trustee for both
itself and defendant, and that each was under a duty to account to the
other for profits as an incident of the trust relationship. 8 A New York
Supreme Court ignored this ingenious contention and held for defendant,9 on the orthodox patent-law view that the parties were tenants
in common of the copyright and in that capacity neither was liable to
r2 Walker, Patents (Deller's ed. 1937) § 365.
'74
N. Y. S. (2d) 425 (ist Dept. 1947).
7
"If one co-author copyrights the musical composition in his own name he
becomes a constructive trustee for the other co-author...." Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 859, 864 (S.D. N. Y. 1942). "... .the
renewal copyright obtained by a co-author of a joint work embraces the whole
work ....
his interest in the renewal copyright is that of an owner in common, (and]
the renewal copyright enures to the benefit of his co-author or of those entitled to
a renewal under the provisions of the Copyright Act .....42 F. Supp. 859, 865. See
also Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property (1944) 202-203, 485.
8Plaintiff based its contention on the rule of note 7, supra. However, while it
is true that the co-owner holding the copyright holds it in trust for the remaining
co-owners, the benefits derived from this "trust" extend only to those rights to
which the co-owners would be entitled had the copyright been in their names also.
An accounting is not necessarily one of these benefits.
'59 N. Y. S. (2d) 728 (N. Y. County 1945).
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the other for profits made by use of the song or by licensing others to
use it.10 However, the Appellate Division, choosing to depart from the
stereotyped patent-law analogy, reversed the judgment and held the
defendant liable to plaintiff for an accounting of the profits made in
licensing the use of the song. The court refused to consider plaintiff's
claim for damages for wastage of the property, saying that the rule laid
down with regard to accounting would promote soundness of marketing and a fair division of profits, and that therefore no decision was required on the other point. Refusing to be controlled by the "name-tag"
given to the relation between the parties," the appellate court based
its decision on the equitableness of requiring an accounting, and reasoned that the contrary rule would lead to co-owners competing with
and contriving against one another in licensing copyrighted works, in
much the same manner as the two litigants in this case had done.
Direct authority on the point at issue is very limited. 12 There is
dicta, however, that would seem to support the rule applied by the Appellate Division court. In Klein v. Beach, the court, in referring to a
1""In the absence of a special agreenment, each co-owner may manufacture, use,
and sell the patented invention with or without the consent of his co-owner, no
matter how small his interest may be, without liability to account for his individual use of the invention, and without being liable to account for profits .
48 C. J.
Patents § 364. See also 2 Walker, Patents (Deller's ed. 1937) § 363.
""We think that the rights of the parties should not be determined by the
name-tag given to their relationship. They are equal owners of a copyrighted work,
and, in the absence of agreement between them governing their rights in the explo.itation of the work, should be held to a standard of dealing befitting their
mutual interest in the work. We may call them tenants in common, but there is
nothing magical in that description, and the incidents of their relationship do not
necessarily follow from that description." Jerry Vogel Music Co., Inc. v. Miller
Music, Inc., 74 N. Y. S. (2d) 425, 426 (1947).
-Representative of the difficulty in reaching a definitive answer to the problem
are two references in Ball, Law of Copyright and Literary Property (1944): At page
202, "The interpretation of the statute creating such common ownership depends
in no small degree upon the well-known incidents of a title by tenancy in common.
Thus, where a copyright is the subject of common ownership, there is no right to an
accounting among the co-owners ....Any act of one is presumed to be for the
common benefit and hence the act of all; such, for example, as the purchase or acquisition of an outstanding title affecting the common property, or a license by one
of the co-owners of certain rights covered by the copyright held in common ownership." At page 587, "When two parties enter into a contract under which they
acquire the ownership, as tenants in common, of all rights in a drama, either coowner is entitled to license its productio on the stage or to contract with a third
party for its conversion into a photoplay for exhibition on the screen, subject to
the duty of the licensor of accounting to his co-owner for the profits or royalties."
The cases cited as authority for these propositions did not involve the issue under
discussion, and statements in the opinions on that point are pure dicta. Similarly,
see 13 C. J., Copyrights §§ 27, 261; 18 C. J. S., Copyrights § 88.
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play written by one person, based on the book of another, said: "Here
both Beach and Klein became the owners of Klein's drama, and each
could then do with it what he pleased, with the duty of accounting
over."' 3 In Maurel v. Smith, the court used the following language:
"Where two or more persons have a common interest in a property,
equity will not allow one to appropriate it exclusively to himself, or to
impair its worth as to others. The settlement of rights between joint
tenants or joint owners of property is the subject matter of equity jurisdiction ....
I,14 The California court, in the more recent case of Brown
v. Republic Productions, Inc., found occasion to state: "By lease or
license one tenant in common may confer upon a stranger the right to
occupy and use the property of the co-tenants to the same extent that
the licensor may have used it ....Such licensor's sole obligation is to
account to his co-tenants."' 15 The direct question of whether or not an
accounting would be required of co-owners was not, however, decided
in any of these cases.
In regard to the more common instances of co-ownership, involving tangible personalty or real property, Anglo-American common law
makes tenants in common accountable to each other for profits made
by using the property or by licensing its use by others.16 But in searching other segments of the law for analogies applicable in copyright
cases, the status of co-owners of patents must be given special attention, because of the traditional connection between patent and copyright matters.
"232 Fed. 240, 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1916). Plaintiff, who had dramatized defendant's novel, contracted with defendant to share the royalties from the play. A
producer was licensed to present the play on the stage, but the rights reverted to
the plaintiff and the defendant because the play was not produced a sufficient number of times. Defendant then gave permission for a movie to be made. The question
for decision was whether the movie was based upon the novel or the play. The court
specifically refrained from deciding the question of accountability.
"271 Fed. 211, 216 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921). Plaintiff contracted with one defendant
to write a scenario and libretto from her opera, then later gave defendant permission to employ a third person to assist, specifically contracting that plaintiff
should share in the profits and royalties. Defendant and his assistant assigned their
rights to publishing company, which took out a copyright on the work. The court
allowed plaintiff an accounting for the profits, on the express terms of the contract.
'156 P. (2d) 40, 41 (Cal. App. 1945). Two co-owners of a song, both employed
by motion picture company, licensed a company to use a song in a motion picture
without obtaining permission from the third co-owner. A lower court allowed an
accounting among the co-owners, but the appellate court did not decide that problem, merely holding that the excluded co-owner could not recover from the licensee
for the licensee's profits.
"62 C. J., Tenancy in Common § 65; 2 Tiffany, Real Property (3 d ed. 1939)
§ 450.
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In the early law of patents in this country, a distinction was made
between a co-owner who himself engaged in business to profit from the
invention and one who merely sold or licensed his right. In the casd
of the co-owner engaging in the business himself, no accounting was
required to account to his co-owners for the profits. 17 This view was
recognized and specifically abandoned in the case of Blackledge v.
Weir & Craig ManufacturingCo.' s There the court denied that use by
the owner and his licensing of the work to another should be treated
differently. It reasoned that in either case, it was not the exercise of the
entire monoply conferred by the patent, and that the remaining coowner still had the same rights he formerly had and was at liberty to
use the invention in all legitimate ways for his individual profit. "Each
[co-owner] is entitled to the fruits of his endeavors, taking no risk and
expecting no reward from enterprises in which he does not choose to
join."19
It seems obvious from the reasoning in the Blackledge case that the
analogy between patents and copyrights breaks down on the point of
accounting. A copyright is usually licensed or sold to a large business
or corporation. Exploitation by that business or corporation is done
on a huge, nationwide basis, as, for example, in a motion picture, or
over coast-to-coast broadcasting networks, or on phonograph records.
Because of these methods, the exercise of the copyright by the owner or
his licensee or assignee may render the most promising ventures useless to the other owners. Fields open to co-owners are materially limited by the sale of the copyrights to a national promoting industry.
The reasoning used by those courts that favor accounting is that
if accounting is not allowed, co-owners will compete with one another
and contrive against one another in selling hnd licensing the work,
materially decreasing the value of the copyright to each owner. On the
other hand, if accounting is allowed, an assignee subjects himself to
an accounting for the profits although he may have risked his own capital and losses.20 It would seem that a return, in the copyright field, to
"See Dunham v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 7 Bissell 223, 8 Fed. Cases, No.
4151 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876).
"*,o8 Fed. 71 (C. C A. 7 th, igoi).
'Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Manufacturing Co., io8 Fed. 71, 76 (C. C. A. 7 th,

lgol).

2'Co-owners may use the work themselves without an accounting. When one
co-owner assigns his right to a third person, that third person becomes the coowner and therefore is entitled to use the work without an accounting. The allinclusive rules laid down by courts ignore the rights of one co-owner against a
former who has assigned his rights to a third person, the new co-owner.
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the original rule of requiring an accounting for the profits derived by
a co-owner who sells or licenses the work, but not requiring an accounting from a co-owner who has himself engaged in business to profit from
the use of the copyright would be the better solution to the problem.
This rule would eliminate the principal objections to the absolute
rules of either allowing or disallowing an accounting, and would result in an equitable settlement between co-owners.
The New York court's decision in the principal case is both equitable and practicable on the facts involved. It is perhaps unfortunate
that the court did not trace the history of both rules, and the reasons
behind them, in order more clearly to show the equitableness of its
decision, to indicate its proper place in the overall picture of accounting, and to provide a more definite guide for future decisions.
JOHN E. ScHEIFLY

DAMAGES-EXTENT

FUL

TO WHICH EARNINGS

OF EMPLOYEE AFTER WRONG-

DISCHARGE APPLY IN MITIGATION OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF

CONTRACT.

[Federal]

The doctrine of avoidable consequences' in the law of damages
has developed from a balancing of two considerations of public policy-the prevention of idle hands, and the promotion of stability of
contractual obligations. Although the latter is desirable, it is even more
important that society be not deprived of the productivity of useful
members by permitting them to remain idle and recover the full measure of damages.2 One of the most familiar applications of the doctrine
3
places an employee who has been wrongfully discharged under a duty
to seek other work in order to minimize the damages arising from the
employer's breach. The amount which is actually earned by the em-

ployee in any other employment during the original contract term, and
the amount which the employee could, by the exercise of proper diligence, have earned in other employment of similar nature, will be cred4
ited to the employer in mitigation of damages.
'McCormick,
Damages (1935) § 33.
2
McCormick, Damages (935) 127.
3
Although courts commonly speak of the plaintiff's "duty" to mitigate damages:
Key v. Kingwvood Oil Co., 11o Okla. 178, 236 Pac. 598, 599 (1924); Tabor v. PorterGildersleeve Co., 271 Pa. 245, 114 At.

773, 774 (1921), it is more accurate to say

that he is placed under "a 'disability' to recover for avoidable loss." McCormick,
Damages (1935) 128.

'Van Winkle v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S. W. 1113, 23 L. R. A. 853 (1894);
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A number of perplexing problems arise out of the part of the rule
requiring a reduction of the damages in the amount which the employee could have earned.*Construction and definition of the elusive
concept of "'proper diligence" have been necessary for applying the
rule to many varying facts. Divergent conclusions are inevitably reached
on such difficult questions as how much effort must the employee exert
in finding other work; over what area must he carry his efforts; 5 to
7
what expense must he go; 6 and what type of work must he accept.
On the other hand, the application of the part of the rule under
which sums actually earned by the employee during the contract term
are credited in mitigation of damages has been comparatively simple.
The principle has been repeatedly reaffirmed that all moneys so earned,
in whatsoever place and type of work, are regarded as reducing the
damages, provided only that the employee could not have made those
earnings without violating his duty under the original employment
contract had the employer not committed the breach.8 Thus, for
Elkhart Rubber Works v. Neff, 46 Ind. App. 382, 92 N. E. 553 (1go); Baltimore Baseball Club v. Pickett, 78 Md. 375, 28 At. 279 (1894); Maynard v. Royal Worcester
Corset Co., 2oo Mass. 1, 85 N. E. 877 (198o); Cutter v. Gillette, 163. Mass. 95, 39 N. E.
1010 (1895); Winkler v. Racine Wagon & Carriage Co., 99 Wis. 184, 74 N. W. 793
(1898).
, The burden of proof is upon the defendant-employer to show what the employee has earned, or what he could have earned by the exercise of reasonable diligence, during the term covered by the contract. Leatherbeery v. Odell, Ragan & Co.,
7 Fed. 641 (C. C. W. D. N. C. 188o); Maynard v. Royal Worcester Corset Co., 2oo
Mass. 1, 85 N. E. 877 (1908).
uSan Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co. v. Collins, 61 S. W. (2d) 84 (Tex. Comm. App.
12933) (wrongfully discharged railroad employee held not required to accept employment at distant places, involving change of residence and loss of position and
seniority in local yards, in mitigation of damages).
ORench v. Hayes Equipment Mfg. Co., 134 Kan. 865, 8 P. (2d) 346, 348, 84 A.
L. R. 166, 169 (1932): "Expenses in seeking other employment, if allowable at all,
must be reasonable, and what would be reasonable would depend upon all the
circumstances. There is good authority for the view that such an element of damages is allowable on wrongful discharge."
7The general rule is that a wrongfully discharged employee is required only to
search for, or accept; employment of a like rank and grade, in the same kind of
work, in the same locality. American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 Fed. 774 (C. C. A.
9 th, 1921) (chief accountant not required to take job as bookkeeper); Curtis v. A.
Lehmann & Co., 115 La. 40, 38 So. 887 (19o5) (general manager not required to take
job as traveling salesman); Cooper v. Stronge & Warner Co., iii Minn. 177, 126
N. W. 541, 27 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1011 (1910).
The only relaxation of this rule is found in some Texas decisions which hold
that if the employee is unable within a reasonable time to secure similar employment, he will be required to seek some other kind of employment for which he is
fitted. Simon v. Allen, 76 Tex. 398, 13 S. W. 296 (189o); Kramer v. Wolf Cigar
Stores Co., 99 Tex. 597, 91 S. W. 775 (19o6).
"Sanders v. Schenley Products Co., 1o8 F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Van Winkle
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example, wages which a wrongfully discharged school superintendent
earned as a farmer have been held to decrease the amount for which
the employer was liable.9
The recent decision in MacKnight v. Twin Cities Broadcasting
Corp.1o demonstrates, however, that even this principle is not so rigidly
crystallized as to be immune from modification in "the hard case which
may make bad law." The plaintiff was employed in an executive position by the broadcasting company, under a contract providing for a
forty hour week and granting the employer the right to require longer
hours of work under certain conditions. This right had seldom, if ever,
been exercised. After being wrongfully discharged, the plaintiff obtained other employment on a forty hour week basis, and in addition
became an instructor in a night school where he worked four and one
half hours two nights a week. When sued for breach of contract, the
broadcasting company claimed to be entitled to credit against the
damages all the earnings gained from the two jobs. The court, in
holding that the money earned by the plaintiff as a night school instructor should not be so credited, advanced two lines of reasoning:
(i) "The evidence indicates that plaintiff could have performed the
extra work of nine hours a week 'without intruding. on that time that
would have been required to discharge his duties under the contract
with the defendant'." (2) "If respondent's theory is correct that it is
entitled by way of mitigation to credit for all earnings of petitioner
regardless of the number of hours worked by him after discharge, inequitable results might obviously ensue. For instance, a discharged
veteran with unusual ambition might put in an eighty hour week.
But, generally speaking, it would be manifestly inequitable to credit a
forty hour a week employer with wages earned by the discharged employee on an eighty hour a week basis."'"
The particular facts of this case, though not revealed in sufficient
detail in the opinion, may have justified the decision for the plaintiff
on the first point; but the court's form of statement of the rule and the
authority relied upon are both open to question. It is to be noted that
v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S.W. 1113, 23 L. R. A. 853 (1894); Gates v. School
District, 57 Ark. 370, 21 S. W. io6o (1893); Nuckolls v. College of Physicians and
Surgeons, 7 Cal. App. 233, 94 Pac. 81 (19o7); Kyle v. Pou, 96 Ga. 166, 23 S.E. 114
(1895); Allgeyer v. Rutherford, 45 S.W. 628 (Tqx. Civ. App. 1898); 2 Sedgwick,
Damages (9th ed. 1920),§ 667; McCormick, Damages 0935) 629.
OGates v. School District, 57 Ark. 370, 21 S. W. 1o6o (1893).
1021 L. R. R. M. 2009, 16 U. S. L. Week 2205 (D. C. Minn. 1947).
uMacKnight v. Twin Cities Broadcasting Corp., 21 L. R. R. M. 2009, 2010 (D.
'C. Minn. 1947) [italics supplied].
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the court speaks only of the intrusion of the employee's extra work
upon the time called for by the original contract of employment. The
element of time, although of major importance, is not the exclusive
factor to be considered. For example, an employee under a forty hour
week contract might, as suggested by the-court, work an additional
forty hours in other employment during times of the day not required
for the original job. Yet it can hardly be denied that the employee
would thereby substantially impair his operational efficiency under the
original contract, and so would have breached his duty to his employer,
but for the latter's breach. Accordingly, the wages so earned by the
extra hours would be credited to the original employer in mitigation
of damages.
In the only case cited as authority, 12 the employment contract
specifically permitted the employee to do outside work, and so the
employer was precluded from contending that working at another job
simultaneously would have constituted a breach of obligation. In the
principal case, the contract not only lacked such a term, but expressly
provided that plaintiff could be required to work extra hours when
conditions demanded. Presumably, this provision would require the
employee to hold himself in readiness for overtime work, and the
night-school teaching could not have been carried on except for the
defendant's breach of the contract. By the usual rule, therefore, the
earnings from that work would be credited against the damages for
the breach. The court denied any effect to this factor, however, because
it did not appear that plaintiff had in fact been-called on to work extra
hours. This conclusion may have been proper as a matter of policy, for
if such a term should be held to require that all earnings must automatically be credited in mitigation of damages, employers might make
a practice of incorporating the provision in all employment contracts
for the sole purpose of obtaining that advantage in case of a breach.
In dealing with the point of intrusion on the contract time, the
court seemed to have in mind a broader concern over the fairness of
the operation of the regular damages rules in such a situation as was
involved in the principal case. Its assertion that "the equitable principle of mitigation does not imply that a wrongfully discharged veteran should'be required to work a forty-nine hour week in order to
lessen the damages to his employer for whom he worked on a forty
hour week basis"' 3 does not quite meet the issue, however. He was
"Sanders v. Schenley Products Co., xo8 F. (2d) 23, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
"'MacKnight v. Twin Cities Broadcasting Corp., 21 L. R. R. M. 2oo9 (D. C.
Minn. 1947)
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not "required" to do so, in the sense that he would have been penalized
had he failed to work the longer hours. But under the general rule,
when the employee has actually made earnings, they are credited
against the damages even if he was not legally required to have done
the work.
A few decisions have been found which support the implication
of the instant case that where the earnings after discharge are made
in more rigorous work than was called for in the original employment,
the employer is not entitled to credit for that part of the earnings attributable to the output of extra effort by the employee. In Evesson v.
Ziegfeld,14 an actress who was employed at ,ioo per week, after wrongful discharge accepted employment at $175 per week in other cities
during a part of the period covered by the original contract. It was
held-that the employer was not entitled to be credited with the excess
over one hundred dollars a week in view of the fact that his contract
called for only seven or eight performances a week, while the subsequent employment involved fourteen performances a week.
Williams v. Chicago Coal Co.' 5 similarly held that the mere fact
that one who is wrongfully discharged receives as much or more in another employment after discharge does not necessarily preclude recovery of substantial damages for breach of contract of employment,
where the subsequent employment is of a different nature from the
work for which he contracted in that it might require more severe effort, greater responsibility and risk of capital.
In Pond v. Wyman' 6 it was declared: "To the extent that the time
Pa. Super. 79 (1903).
156o Ill. 149, 1 Mor. Min. Rep. 397 (1871). The court declared: "...some questions of fact must necessarily be involved, viz: Was the employment of the same
general character, or was the labor more severe, or the responsibility greater or less?
Was the new business such as required the use of capital, while that from which he
was discharged did not? If a young man should enter into a contract with a merchant, to act as his clerk for a specified time, at a stated salary, and be wrongfully
discharged, and if the only employment he could get would be to work as a brakeman on railroad trains, would it be claimed that because he received as much wages
as a brakeman as he was to receive as a clerk, such facts would constitute a defense
for the merchant? Would they, as a matter of law, operate as mitigation of damages, to such as were nominal, merely? Clearly not; simply because the question of
fact should be passed upon whether the labor was not different in character and
more severe in the performance." 6o Ill. 149, 155 (1871).
2Z15iMo. 175, 183 (1851). Defendant entered into a contract with plaintiff for
the purpose of drawing plans and specifications for a school house, and agreed to
permit plaintiff to superintend its construction, but later prevented plaintiff from
fulfilling the contract. The opinion does not indicate the nature of the substitute
work in which plaintiff engaged.
1"22
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of the plaintiff, which would be required to perform the contract,
has been employed in business, not more laborious, and equally profitable, it is evident that he would not be injured by tie violation of the
contract. Yet, to give him the full benefit of his contract, he must be
entitled to the difference in advantage, in ease and profit, between the
service he was to perform, and the business substituted for that service,
although his whole time might have been employed."
The line of thought projected by these cases, as well as the principal
case, is unquestionably logical, but seems certain to lead to almost
prohibitive difficulties of administration. If every contingency and
deviation in ease and comfort as well as position and convenience is to
be considered in determining the measure 'of damages on the facts of
each individual case, the ramifications become numberless and the door
to extravagant speculation is opened wide. It is obvious that no dependable standard can be applied in the determination of whether one
particular job is more demanding on the worker than another. And
if it is decided that the work done after discharge is more difficult than
that of the original employment, there is no logical system for allocating part of the earnings to the degree of greater difficulty.17 Left
with no definable standard for deciding such issues, juries will surely
reach their conclusions on the basis of irrelevant considerations.
Though the court in the MacKnight decision deserves commendation for its efforts to give effect to some appealing equities in favor of
the employee, its approach to the issue opens up such a multitude of
administrative difficulties that doubt remains as to whether satisfactory
results can be achieved under the rule of the case.
CHARLES F. BLACKBURN
17As an illustration, consider the following hypothetical case: A works for B
as a laborer in a coal mine. His contract of employment requires a forty hour week
with time and a half for overtime at the rate of $.oo an hour. He is a member of
the union and receives whatever benefits are to be derived therefrom. A is in ill
health due to the working conditions in the mine, and a substantial part of his
income is paid out in medical bills. A is wrongfully discharged by B. There are no
other coal mines in the vicinity and A obtains a job as chauffeur and gardener for
C, a very rich man. The new employment requires A to work fifty hours a week at
the rate of 8o cents an hour. The work is all out of doors, and in a month's time
A's health is so improved that he no longer has to spend money on doctor's bills.
In addition, C furnishes A, for C's own convenience, room, board, and uniforms
reasonably worth Soo per month. C always makes a substantial gift to all of his
employees at Christmas time and besides that takes A to Florida with him at least
once a year.
Under the general rule, the measure of damages is easily ascertainable. The
tendency of the court in MacKnight v. Twin Cities Broadcasting Corp.-i.e., that of
considerating all factors in attempting to give the employee the full benefit of his
contract-would result in mere speculation.
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OF DAMAGES IN CONTRACT AND TORT ACTIONS FOR

DESTRUCTION OF GROWING CROPS.

[California]

In the recent California case of Dutra v. Cabral,' plaintiff brought
an action for damages 2 caused by defendant's failure to supply water
as provided for in a lease under which plaintiff was to receive 8o% of
the market price of the crops he was to raise on the leased premises.
The crops failed because defendant did not furnish the water. In reviewing the case on the question of the proper measure of damages,3
the Supreme Court of California was required to determine what
specific formula would satisfy the general statutory mandate that:
"For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the
measure of damages... is the amount which will compensate
the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused
thereby, or which, in the' 4ordinary course of things would be
likely to result therefrom.
Indicative of a general uncertainty of approach to this issue is the
legislature's use of the tort-law language of "proximate cause" in fixing a standard of recovery for contract cases. The court may have been
unconsciously following this wavering path of logic when it recited two
inconsistent rules for the measure of damages for destruction of growing annual crops. Remarking that the cost of planting and cultivating,
the crops had merged into the market value, the court quoted the following language from a case where the theory of the action was in tort:
"'The true measure of damages for the total destruction of a
growing or standing crop is the value of the crop in the condition it was in at the time and place of destruction'." 5
Three paragraphs later in the opinion, a general rule was laid down
that "the measure of damages for the.., destruction of planted
crops... is the local market value of the crops at the time and place of
destruction, less the cost of producing and marketing the same." 6 The
1181 P.

(2d) 26 (Cal. 1947).

2California has one form of civil action. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code (Deering, 1941)

§

307.

3
The appellate court had three issues to decide: Was the verdict sustained by
the evidence; were the damages excessive; and had the defendant successfully carried the burden of showing necessity for the plaintiff to minimize the damages? Although the lower court had erred in the instructions as to the measure of damages,
it was held that the defendant could not take advantage of this error as it was
favorable to him. 181 P. (2d) 26, 29 (Cal. 1947).

'Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 3300.
r,81 P. (2d) 26, 29 (Cal. 1947).
0181 P. (2d) 26, 30 (Cal. 1947).
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decisions cited for this last proposition are all tort cases, and it is submitted that a more accurate analysis indicates their rule to be that the
measure of damages is the actual value of the crop at the time of the
injury, and that the market value of the crop at maturity is merely some
1
evidence of this value.
When the theory of the action is breach of contract, the perfect
recovery would put the plaintiff ahead to where he would have been
but for the defendant's failure to perform. 8 The ideal measure of
damages would determine what the total value of the marketed crop
would have been, and deduct the cost of producing and marketing that
the plaintiff was spared after the breach by defendant caused the failure
of crops. Such a recovery includes in it the plaintiff's expenditures and
his loss of profits which normally are treated as two separate items.9
This test involves only the normal difficulty of ascertaining the future
of that particular crop that failed and the actual market value of the
crop in view of the events which subsequently did occur. The damages
7The court cites Staub v. Muller, 7 Cal. (2d) 221, 228, 6o P. (2d) 283, 286 (1936),
where the court was dealing with perennial crops, and in speaking of damage to a
mature crop said the measure of damages was the "local market value of the crop
less the cost of production and marketing." The only fair inference is that they
were speaking of market values as of the time the crop was mature.
In Fay v. Cox, 45 Cal. App. 696, 188 Pac. 623 (1920), the defendant had negligently set fire to the plaintiff's mature barley crop. The court, in approving Teller
v. Bay & River Dredging Co., 151 Cal. 209, 90 Pac. 942 (19o7), took the position
that the value of the crop at the time of its destruction is the correct measure of
damages and that the market value at maturity or a reasonable time after destruction is proper evidence. "'While all such evidence may be considered by the jury
in determining the amount of damages, if any, still the true measure of compensation is the value of the crops in the condition they were in at the time of their
injury or destruction.'" 188 Pac. 623, 626 (1920). Notice again that if the inquiry
is reduced to the value of the crop at the time of destruction, the chance of its
maturing becomes the most significant variable of all in placing a dollars and cents
evaluation on it.
In Strecker v, Gaul, 35 Cal. App. 619, 170 Pac. 646 (1917) the court held that
the measure of damages was to be determined by the market value at harvest time,
less the cost of cutting, baling and hauling to market. Here the court allowed loss
of profits as having been "proximately caused" by the injury.
In Dennis v. Crocker-Huffman L. & W. Co., 6 Cal. App. 58, 91 Pac. 425 (1907)
the court held that for a tort the true measure of damages was the value of the
crops in the condition they were in at the time of destruction and that market value
at maturity was merely evidentiary.
8
1t is not the purpose of this comment to go into factors which would qualify
and limit recovery short of this ideal goal, such as remote and speculative profits
and mitigation of damages.
D2 Sedg-wick, Damages (9th ed. 192o) §§ 616, 624, 633E and cases cited. Note that
in some instances the form of instruction will allow recovery for expenses where in
fact there would have been a net loss if profits were considered.
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are proved by reference to actual developments during the rest of the
season and by reference to the market conditions in effect at harvest
time.10
When the theory of the action is in tort, the ideal recovery would
return the plaintiff to the status quo ante. The basic inquiry is as to
the plaintiff's situation just before the tort was committed. This ideal
is often expressed as the "actual present value" of his crop at the time,
place and condition it was in when destroyed." What the plaintiff
actually has lost is his prospect of having a mature crop.12 Though this
prospect is a chance which is recognized in business enterprise and in
crop insurance, the law of damages is steeped in precedent against the
recognition of the value of a chance.
The refusal to instruct on the value of the prospects of having a
crop leads to the adoption of diverse systems for ascertaining the actual
present value of the crop destroyed. Normally, market value, though
one step away from the ideal of actual value, is the best evidence of
value. But, except in rare instances in which the sale of partly-grown
crops is customary, there is no market value as of the time and condition of the crop just before destruction. Thus, before the jury has anything concrete to measure with, another step away from the ideal is
necessary. Reference must be made to the probable future market
value of the crop if it had matured. These two steps are taken in different forms of instruction in different jurisdictions. Some courts declare that the measure of recovery is the present value of the crop, then
admit as evidence of this value the probable yield and probable market value when harvested, and instruct that from these two factors
must be deducted costs of further production which were not incurred
but otherwise would have been.' 3 Other courts take a third step away
from the ideal by stating that the measure of damages is the probable
market value of the crop when harvested less the probable cost of
further production. 14 It is to be noted that this last form of instruction
'-Rios v. Azcuenaga, ig Idaho 739, 115 Pac. 922 (191i); Smith v. Hicks, 14 N.
M. 56o, 98 Pac. 138, 19 L. R. A. (N.S.) 938 (1908); Colorado Co. v. McFarland, 94 S.
W. 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. x9o6).
"McCormick, Damages (1935) 486, note 21 and cases cited.
'-For a case which recognizes the plaintiff's prospects as an element of damages,
see Zuidema v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 223 Ill. App. 13o (1921).
nTeller v. Bay & River Dredging Co., 151 Cal. 209, 90 Pac. 942, 12 L. R. A. (N.s.)
267 (19o7); Hall v. Brown, 102 Ore. 389, 202 Pac. 719 (1921); Lester v. Highland
Boy Gold Mining Co., 27 Utah 470, 76 Pac. 341 (1904).
"United Verde Copper Co. v. Ralston, 46 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Hanken
v. United States, 5o F. Supp. 996 (E. D. Pa. 1943); International Agr. Corp. v. Aber-
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retains its tort theory characteristics only to the extent that its language
is prospective, and that if probabilities are resolved into actualities it
becomes a perfdct instruction under contract recovery.15
The theoretical differences between the two measures of recovery
are simple to state. Where the theory of recovery is breach of contract,
hindsight should be used, and the triers of fact should look back upon
all events up to and including the price at marketing time, and base
their decision on actual occurrences. 16 This involves little difficulty
because normally neighboring crops have actually matured and been
sold on the market. Where the theory of recovery is tort, the triers of
fact should put themselves in the position of the plaintiff at the time
of thieinjury, and use foresight to determine the value of his prospects
and the injury thereto.' 7 But the increased difficulties of proof of such
a measure, plus the insistent determination not to recognize the value
of a chance, has forced the courts to resort to the market value measure,
with the result that there is a tendency to treat the two theories of recovery as the same.
Nevertheless, certain differences should still be observed. When
the theory of recovery is breach of contract, the jury is trying to find
the actual market value of the plaintiff's probable yield in light of all
the events that have happened.1S Thus, in theory at least, the jury
crombie, 184 Ala. 244, 63 So. 549 (1913); Harrington v. Blohm, 136 Ark. 231, 206 S.
W. 316 (1918); Smith v. Hicks, 14 N. M. 56o, 98 Pac. 138 (19o8).
"Still another line of authority apparently recognizes the hopelessness of the
market value of the crop test and offers the plaintiff the decreased rental value of
the land as his recovery. Notice that in determining the decrease in rental value,
the loss of the prospects for a good crop plays the only important role, either consciously or unconsciously. This rule has been applied most frequently in cases of
injury to perennial crops or to young and immature annual crops. It has been applied in both tort and breach of contract cases. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v.
Hixon, 11o Ind. 225, 11 N. E. 285 (1887). For the application of this rule to a breach
of contract case, see Pallett v.Murphy, 131 Cal. 192, 63 Pac. 366 (19oo).
"McCormick, Damages (1935) 561.
17A good example of the proper application of the tort principal is Zuidema v.
Sanitary District of Chicago, 223 Ill. App. 138 (1921).
"Bell v. Reynolds, 78 Ala. 51o, 515, 56 Am. Rep. 52, 56 (1885) is a good example
of hindsight calculation applied to a breach of contract case. The action was for
failure to furnish fertilizer. The court said: "Speculative opinions of witnesses, as
to the probable influences of [season, soil, and climate) ....would be a poor criterion for the measure of values ....In this case, however, these difficulties are entirely removed. The character of the season is absolutely known. So is the precise
effect of fertilizer used during this particular season. No speculation is needed as
to how much rain and how much sunshine were requisite to produce a given amount
of crops to the acre, nor as to the probable effect of the fertilizer upon different
kinds of soil, or even the proportion of it best suited to the land, and therefore
what would necessarily have been produced on the remainder, which is shown to
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should consider the abnormal event if it occurs. A drought which
would have ruined the crops should count against the plaintiff as much
as the necessity of feeding Europe and the fact of a good crop year
would count for him in considering market value and yield. 19 When
the theory is tort, the prospect at the time of injury is the material
element. Evidence of actual yield of similar crops should not be used
to establish the very item of recovery but to give an indication of the
value of his normal prospects at the time of his loss. No abnormal
events that happened after the defendant's wrongdoing should weigh
20
in the balance.
The theoretical distinction usually breaks down when the courts
apply the more simple contract test of market value at maturity less
further costs of production as the measure of damages in a tort case,
in an effort to recompense the plaintiff for his prospects without recognizing their value in so many words. In the instant case, the California
court is in the unusual position of applying tort precedents to the comparatively simple contract situation, when in fact it had ample precedent in its own jurisdiction dealing with breach of irrigation contracts
21
on the contract theory of damages.
The use of the "single form of action" procedural system does not
justify the indiscriminate intermingling of tort and contract principles,
and this is especially evident in California where the legislature has
expressly preserved the tort-contract distinction in regard to damages
measures.22

It seems probable that neither party was prejudiced by the confused
thinking which crept into the principal decision. However, if there is
have been in precisely the same state of cultivation, and similar in quality of soil."
(italics supplied). Notice that the court is dealing in actualities looking back after
the events that in fact did occur.
"Itis doubtful whether this theory can be carried to its logical extreme, since
at plaintiff's option he may sue only for expenses incurred before breach. 2 Sedgwick,
Damages (1920) § 6M6 and cases cited.
1'Zuidema v. Sanitary District of Chicago, 223 Ill. App. 138 (1921).
nIn Allen v. Los Molinas Land Co., 25 Cal. App. 2o6, 143 Pac. 253 (1914) a plaintiff whose half-grown crops had been destroyed because the defendant failed to
supply water was awarded damages in a sum equal to what the value of the potato
crop would have been if water had been furnished, less the additional costs and expenses that would have been incurred in taking care of, harvesting and selling the
crop. This decision has been followed on its statement as to the measure of damages for breach of contracts in the following cases: Griffith v. Welbanks & Co., 29
Cal. App. 238, 155 Pac. 120, 123 (1915); Parkinson v. Langdon, 36 Cal. App. 8o, 171
Pac. 71o (1918); Chrisman v. Southern California Edison Co., 256 Pac. 618, 629 (Cal.
App. (1927); Cross v. Ramdullah, 274 Fed. 762, 77, (C. C. A. 9th, 1921).
nCal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) §§ 3300, 3333-
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any valid reason for continuing to distinguish between the purposes
of the two types of recovery, this decision may well become a source
of embarrassment to the California court if it is cited as precedent in
some subsequent case in which a clear observance of the contract-tort
distinction is needed.
EDMUND

EVIDENCE-INVALIDITY
BASED

UNDER

ON CONFESSIONS

DUE PROCESS

D.

WELLS, JR.

CLAUSE OF CONVICTIONS

OBTAINED BY DURESS.

[United States Su-

preme Court]
The adoption by state police officers of so-called third degree
methods to extort confessions from suspected criminals has in the past
twelve years brought before the Supreme Court of the United States
a series of cases to test the validity of convictions obtained by such
means. In nine of the ten decisions, the Court has invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the weapon with which
to strike down convictions based on allegedly involuntary confessions. 1
Brown v. Mississippi,2 decided in 1936, was the first decision in
which the operation of the due process clause was extended to this issue.3 Brown and another defendant were arrested and taken to jail. A
deputy sheriff, other officers, and a group of white men went to the
jail, made them remove their clothes and lay over chairs, and flogged
them with a heavy leather strap with a metal buckle on it. This whipping was continued until the victims confessed in every manner of detail as demanded by those present. After the confessions were obtained,
defendants were warned of receiving the same treatment again should
they change fheir story. The confession obtained by this means was
used by the State of Mississippi to convict Brown. Aside from it, there
was no evidence sufficient to warrant the submission of the case to the
jury. Facts regarding the physical mistreatment were not only undisputed, but the mistreatment was admitted to have been administered
by officers of the state. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
invalidated the conviction, declaring:
"... . the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authori'Cases cited in notes 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, infra.
2297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 8o L. ed. 682 (1936).
Note (1940) 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 58, 59. "-in Brown v. Mississippi ...the
Supreme Court for the first time extended the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to include the privilege against self-incrimination as against the States."
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ties have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions
obtained by violence. The due process clause requires 'that
state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be
consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'."
"It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting
to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus
obtained as the basis 'for
conviction and sentence was a clear
4
denial of due process.
This declaration afforded an important step in the protection of civil
rights of persons accused of crime. However, cases involving this problem in clear cut form seldom arise because of the difficulty of proving
that torturous methods were in fact resorted to by the law enforcement
officials. In most cases, the accused is taken into custody of the officers,
and all proceedings leading up to his confession are conducted behind
closed doors with only these same officials as witnesses. When such an
accused introduces evidence of violent mistreatment, he is met with
unanimous contradictory testimony by the officials against whom he
has complained. 5
Four years later in Chambers v. Florida," the Supreme Court unanimously held that the Fourteenth Amendment applies with the same effect in a situation in which the charge of the use of physical mistreatnient was not clearly proved,7 but in which there was positive evidence
that the accused had been questioned severely over long periods of
time under conditions capable of inspiring terror. The record in this
case showed, without conflict, that the young, ignorant, colored farmer
was repeatedly questioned and cross-questioned by state officers and
other white citizens in a fourth floor jail room, where as a prisoner he
was without friend or counsel, and under circumstances calculated to
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278, 286, 56 S. Ct. 461, 465, 8o L. ed. 682, 687
(1936)_
rEvidence of this difficulty is apparent from the Supreme Court's method of
handling such a problem. Each time the Court is faced with this dilemma, it
places such controverted evidence to one side. See Chambers v. Florida, 3o9 U. S.
227, 231, 6o S. Ct. 472, 474, 84 L. ed. 716, 719 (1940); Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S.
219, 23o, 62 S. Ct. 280, 287, 86 L. ed. 166, 176-177 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S.
547, 550-552, 62 S. Ct. 1139, 1141-1142, 86 L. ed. 1663, 1665-1666 (1942); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 152, 64 S. Ct. 921, 925, 88 L. ed. 1192, 1198 (1944); Malinski
v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 405-4o6, 65 S. Ct. 781, 783-784, 89 L. ed. 1029 (1945).
84 L. ed. 716 (1940).
7Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 231, 6o S. Ct. 472, 474, 84 L. ed. 716, 719
(1940).
6309 U. S. 227, 6o S. Ct. 472,
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break the strongest nerves and stoutest resistance. Basing its decision
upon this record the Court said:
"To permit human lives to be forfeited upon confessions
thus obtained would make of the constitutional requirement of
due process of law a meaningless symbol."
"Today, as in ages past, we are not without tragic proof that
the exalted power of some governments to punish manufactured
crime dictatorially is the handmaid of tyranny. Under our constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as
havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public excitement. Due
process of law, preserved for all by our Constitution, commands
disclosed by this record shall send
that no such practice as that
any accused to his death." s
In the four years following this decision, eight cases of very similar
nature were carried to the Supreme Court to test convictions which had
1
10
9
been sustained by the highest courts of Alabama, Texas, California,
13
Tennessee, 12 and New VYork. Seven of the convictions were invalireasoning much the same as that
dated on due process grounds, upon
14
case.
Chambers
the
in
employed
Striking evidence of the widespread employment of these questionable practices by police officers is found in the many common elements
of the fact situations in these cases. In most of them, the confessions
were taken from Negro men of humble station in life, and of comparatively low degree of intelligence, most of whom were too poor to employ counsel and too friendless to have any one advise them of their
8
Chambers v. Florida, og U. S. 227; 240-241, 6o S. Ct. 472, 479, 84 L. ed. 716, 724
(1940).
DCanty v. Alabama, 3o9 U. S. 629, 6o S. Ct. 612, 84 L. ed. 988 (194o); Vernon v.
Alabama, 313 U. S. 547, 61 S. Ct. 1092, 85 L. ed. 1513 (1941).
"White v. Texas, 3o9 U. S. 631, 60 S. Ct. 7o6, 84 L. ed. 989 (194o); Lomax v.
Texas, 313 U. S. 544, 61 S. Ct. 956; 85 L. ed. 1511 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S.
547, 62 S. Ct. 1139, 86 L. ed. 1663 (1942).
ULisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 62 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. ed. 166 (1941).
2
1 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 64 S. Ct. 921, 88 L. ed. 1192 (1944).
"Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L. ed. o029 (1945).
2'Canty v. Alabama, 3o9 U. S. 629, 6o S. Ct. 612, 84 L. ed. 988 (194o); White v.
Texas, 309 U. S. 631, 6o S. Ct. 706, 84 L. ed. 989 (1940); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S.
544, 61 S. Ct. 956, 85 L. ed. 1511 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547, 61 S. Ct.
1092, 85 L. ed. 1513 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 16 U. S.547, 62 S. Ct. 1139, 86 L. ed.
1663 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L. ed. 1192 (1944);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S.4oi, 65 S. Ct. 781, 89 L. ed. 1029 (1945).
In the Canty, Lomax and Vernon cases, the state court decisions were reversed
without opinion, on the authority of the Chambers case.
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rights had they been given an opportunity to do so. 15 They were grilled over long periods of time under various terrorizing conditions,' 6
and when the controverted evidence of physical mistreatment was considered, it was put to one side by the Supreme Court.17
In Lisenba v. California, 8 the single instance in this series of cases
in which the conviction was sustained, several of the foregoing elements were notably absent. The defendant was a white man, experienced in business, very shrewd, and of a nature not easily intimidated.
That these factors had some effect upon the decision is clearly indicated at one point in the majority opinion:
"We have not hesitated to set aside cofivictions based in
whole, or in substantial part, upon confessions extorted in graver
circumstances. These were secured by protracted and repeated
questioning of ignorant and untutored persons, in whose minds
the power of officers was greatly magnified; who sensed the adverse sentiment of the community and the danger of mob violence; who had been held incommunicado, without the advice
of friends or of counsel; some of whom had been taken by officers at night from the prison into dark and lonely places for
questioning. This case is outside the scope of those decisions."' 9
It is to be noted also that in this case there was substantial evidence in addition to the confession pointing to the guilt of the defen15In the following cases, defendants were poor, illiterate Negroes: Brown v. MisSiSsippi, 297 U. S. 278, 56 S. Ct. 461, 8o L. ed. 682 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U. S. 227, 6o S. Ct. 472, 84 L. ed. 716 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U. S. 629, 60
S. Ct. 612, 84 L. ed. 988 (1940); White v. Texas, 3o9 U. S. 631, 6o S. Ct. 7o6, 84 L. ed.
989 (1940); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U. S. 544, 61 S. Ct. 956, 85 L. ed. 1511 (1941);
Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U. S. 547, 61 S. Ct. 1092, 85 L. ed. 1513 (1941); Ward v.
Texas, 316 U. S. 547, 62 S. Ct. 1139, 86 L. ed. 1663 (1942).
1OPetitioner was questioned from the afternoon of May 2oth until sunrise of the
21st without the aid of friend or counsel in Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 230,
6o S. Ct. 472, 474, 84 L. ed. 716, 718 (1940); after being interrogated on several successive nights in the woods by Texas Rangers, defendant confessed in White v.
Texas, 310 U. S. 530, 532-533, 60 S. Ct. 1032, 1033, 84 L. ed. 1342, 1344-1345 (1940);
accused was questioned in three different jails on three different days as he was
being taken around to various places in the state in Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547,
551, 62 S.Ct. 1139, 1141, 86 L.ed. 1663, 1665-1666 (1942); defendant was questioned
in a jail room before a table with high-powered overhead lights from 7:00 p.m.
Saturday until 9:30 a.m. Monday without sleep or rest in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U. S. 143, 149, 64 S. Ct. 921, 924, 88 L. ed. 1192, 1196-1197 (1944); accused was
arrested and taken to a hotel where he was questioned for three hours with all his
clothes removed in Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 403, 65 S. Ct. 781, 782, 89
L. ed. 1029 (1945).
" See note 5,supra.
"314 U. S. 219, 62 S. Ct. 280, 86 L. ed. 166 (1941).
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 239-24o, 62 S. Ct. 280, 291, 86 L. ed. 166,
181-182 (1941).
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dant. The Court made no mention of this fact, and in later cases 20 it
has declared that the existence of such supporting evidence of guilt has
no bearing upon the due process issue. However, it must be extremely
difficult for even the most clear thinking judge to eliminate such considerations entirely from his mind in close cases.
In the latest case in this series, and the only post-war decision on
the issue, the Supreme Court has conformed to the general pattern of
the earlier cases, while emphasizing the significance of one factor not
previously considered. In Haley v. Ohio,21 decided in January, 1948, the
accused was a 15-year old Negro boy who was arrested for robbery and
murder. He was not permitted to see counsel or friend and was questioned behind closed doors from mid-night until dawn by relays of
policemen. Following this all-night ordeal, the defendant was shown
confessions of his two friends, likewise suspected of the same crimes,
and he confessed. This confession along with other evidence against
the accused was introduced by the State of Ohio to secure a conviction.
However, the age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the
duration of his quizzing, the absence of any friend or counsel to advise
him, and the callous attitude of the police towards his rights all combined to convince the majority of the Supreme Court that the confession was wrung from a child in a manner which could not be squared
with that due process of law which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. 22 The closeness of the case is well indicated by the 5 to 4 decision, 23 and the vigorous nature of the dissenting opinion. The dissenting Justices considered the issue a clear question of fact, and, relying
upon the decision. in Lisenba v. California, stated that such issues
should be determined by the triers of fact. 24 They were also of the opin2uLyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 597, 64 S. Ct. 1208, 121o, 88 L. ed. 1481,
1483 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404, 65 S. Ct. 781, 783, 89 L. ed.
1029 (1945).
"322 U. S. 596, 68 S. Ct. 302 (1948).
'Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 6oo-6oi, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948).
OJustice Burton wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, in which Justices Reed and
Jackson and Chief Justice Vinson joined. Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for
the Court, but only Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge joined in that opinion.
The majority necessary for the reversal of the state court decision was mustered
from the vote of Justice Frankfurter, who wrote a special concurring opinion.
2'Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 623, 68 S. Ct. 302, 314-315 (1948). Mr. Justice
Burton declared: "The rule of law governing this case is stated in Lisenba v. California: '... an issue has been resolved by the court and jury which involves an answer to the due process question. In such a case, we accept the determination of
the triers of fact, unless it is so lacking in support in the evidence that to give it
effect would work that fundamental unfairness which is at war with due process'."
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ion that there was little need for such a confession because of the ad25
ditional evidence in the case.
In addition to the significant factors in the previous cases supporting the determination that coercion had been used, the Court relied heavily upon the fact of the youth of the accused. In the course of
a comparatively short opinion, Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated seven times that the petitioner had been only 15 years of
age at the time of his arrest. The significance of this factor is elaborated
in detail:
"Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race.
He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can
overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the
period of great instability which the crisis of adolescence produces. A 15-year old lad, questioned through the dead of night
by relays of police, is a ready victim of the inquisition. Mature
men possibly might stand the ordeal from midnight to 5 a.m.
But we cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for
the police in such a contest." 26
Doubtlessly these decisions are the dispair of many law-enforcement
officers who may be so hard pressed by public opinion to obtain convictions that they feel it necessary to apply some coercion to obtain
confessions as buttresses for circumstantial evidence of guilt. The firm
stand which has been taken in the cases in the past decade seems to
demonstrate that the Supreme Court is deliberately acting in a remedial capacity to check the use of such practices. 27 The employment of
the very flexible due process clause to this end gives the Court a sufficiently adaptable source of authority to allow for the careful scrutiny
'Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 609, 68 S. Ct. 302, 308 (1948): "In considering
the record as a whole ...it is appropriate to note that the foregoing undisputed
facts left comparatively little need for such a confession as was signed by Haley."
2°Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 599-6oo, 68 S. Ct. 302, 304 (1948).
-1The case of Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U. S. 742, 68 S. Ct. 3oo (1948), decided one
week after Haley v. Ohio, gives some support to this premise by indicating the
zeal with which the Court protects the right of a convicted defendant to raise the
constitutional issue. At the trial, the defendant had testified both that he had
never made the alleged confession at all, and that the alleged confession had been
obtained from him by duress, threats and violence. The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction on the reasoning that the accused cannot be allowed to
claim that a confession was obtained by unconstitutional means when he also claims
that he never made the confession. The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the conviction, declaring that "inconsistent testimony as to
the confession should not and cannot preclude the accused from raising the due
process issue in an appropriate manner." 332 U. S.742, 745, 68 S.Ct. 300, 302.
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of the circumstances of each case before declaring the conviction illegal. However, the decisions make it clear that nearly every doubt is
likely to be resolved in favor of the accused.
BENTON C.

INsURANCE-RECOVERY

FOR DETH

IN MILITARY AvIATION

TOLLEY, JR.

ACCIDENT

UNDER POLICY WITH AvIATION CLAUSE BUT No WAR CLAUSE. [O1io]

Arising as an outgrowth of aviation accidents during the war is a

series of cases in which plaintiffs have sought recovery under life insurance policies which contained an "aviation clause"' but did not
contain the standard "war clause. ' 2 Though the insured parties have
in each case been killed in military plane crashes, plaintiffs have argued
that because the company did not attach any provision relating to
military service, the policy was not intended to exclude the hazard of

flying in military service, and the aviation clause must be construed
as referring to civilian flying only.

The most recent adjudication on this point is the 4 to 3 decision of
the Ohio Supreme Court in Conaway v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia.3 The insured, then a civilian, applied for a policy with the defendant company in 1940. In the application, he stated that he had
made several trips in aircraft but had failed to pass his test as a civilian
air reserve pilot, that he was not in military service, and that he did
not contemplate owning a plane. Six days after the application was
made, the company issued his policy with the following indorsement
attached:

"On account of the aviation hazard of the insured, this policy
is issued with the following amendment: Death as a result directly or indirectly of service, travel or flight in or on any species
of aircraft, except as a farepaying passenger in a licensed plane
"'Death as a result, directly or indirectly, or service, travel, or flight in any
species of aircraft, except as a passenger on a regularly scheduled passenger flight
of a duly licensed common carrier, is a risk not assumed under this policy; but,
if the Insured shall die as a result, directly or indirectly, of such service, travel, or
flight, the Company will pay to the beneficiary the reserve on this policy." Typical
example of an aviation clause taken from Knouse v. Equitable Life. Insurance Co.
of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P. (2d) 310, 311 (1947).
-"Ii is expressly provided that death while in the service in the army or navy of
the government in time of war is not a risk covered at any time during the continuance or reinstatement of this policy for any gfeater sum than the amounts actually
paid to the Company thereon." Typical example of a war clause taken from Miller
v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310 (1919).
376 N. E. (2d) 284 (Ohio 1947).
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operating on a regular schedule with a licensed pilot over established air lines, is a risk not assumed under this policy .... ,,4
The only mention of war in the entire policy was in the double indemnity portion, and there death in the service during wartime was
excluded from double recovery only. A year and a half later insured
became a pilot of a Navy torpedo bomber and subsequently lost his life
in a crash at sea. The Supreme Court of Ohio allowed the beneficiary
to recover under the policy, and in so doing stressed the language of
the indorsement. Since it read, "On account of the aviation hazard of
the insured," the court felt that the words referred specifically to the
answers in the application which indicated that only private civilian
flying was in the minds of the parties when the contract was made. The
court intimated that if the indorsement had read merely, "On account
of aviation hazard," recovery might have been disallowed. 5 But as the
policy stood, it was held to be ambiguous, and particularly so since
the only mention of war was in the double indemnity clause.
In reaching its decision, the court cited no authority whatever, and
three judges dissented. These judges felt that the language of the indorsement was intended to cover both military and civilian aviation
hazards since war and military service were imminent; and inasmuch as
the language of the policy was clear and unequivocal, there was no
room for construction.
In the construction of insurance contracts, it has long been held that
the policy is to be most strongly construed against the maker, and that
any ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the insured. 6 Because
the insurance company chooses the language, this canon is an excellent
one where real ambiguity and uncertainty exist, but it is not and was
never intended to be a justification for varying the legal effect of
terms when the meaning of the language is clear. 7 Very often insurance
policies have contradictory provisions, and this rule of construction
may be aptly used to resolve the conflict. However, the employment of
the word "ambiguous" as a screen for mere result-getting is certainly
a misuse of the rule, and courts should be extremely careful in using
the device.
Supporting the Ohio court is the 1944 New York decision in Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co.8 There the facts presented an even stronger
'Conaway v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 76 N. E. (2d)

284, 285 (Ohio 1947).
Conaway v. Life Insurance Co. of Va., 76 N. E. (2d) 284, 285 (Ohio 1947).
61 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1919) § 88.
7i
Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law (1919) § 184.
s183 Misc. 887, 52 N. Y. S. (2d) 29o (1944).
5
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case for the insurande company, because the aviation clause did not
contain specific terms referring to the insured, as was true in the Conaway case. In construing this policy the court said:
".... It tells the insured, if you travel by air, the company is not

liable in the event of your death, unless you travel under circumstances that are outlined in your policy .... This, to my
mind, means civilian flying. ... because the very next clause
mentions 'except for violation of the conditions of the contract relating to military or naval service.'... In this case Lieutenant Paradies followed the colors into the shock of invasion.
He is a military casualty. He was in a plane, that's true, when
he met his death. If he were killed in a foxhole, on a landing
beach, or lost at sea, I am certain the defendant would have
paid,... so... I feel substantial justice requires me to say...
[judgment for the plaintiff]." 9
The opinion failed to cite a single case in favor of its views. It seems
quite evident that had decedent died in a foxhole the defendant would
have paid, but it is difficult to see how that analogy applied to aviation
when the plain language of the policy excluded death from flight in
"any species of aircraft."' 10 The court iu its effort to do "substantial justice" to the plaintiff has made a substantial addition to the language
of the policy. 11
In the greater number of cases, the courts have been unwilling to
find ambiguity from the mere fact that the policy contained an "aviation clause" and not a "war clause." In a federal Circuit Court of Appeals case12 on the point, the plaintiff contended that military and
OParadies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 Misc. 887, 888, 52 N. Y. S. (2d)

(1944).
"'Paradies v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 Misc. 887, 888,
(1944).

52

N. Y. S. (2d)

290, 291
290, 291

"See Durland v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 Misc. 58o, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 7oo
(1946), in which another New York Supreme Court distinguished the facts of the
Durland case from the Paradies case, and refused to follow the latter decision. In
the Durland case there was a specific clause stating that the policy was free from
any military service exclusion, but directly under it there was a rubber stamped
imprint referring to the aviation rider attached.
One of the earliest cases involving this-same question was Sovereign Camp, W.
0. W. v. Compton, 14o Ark. 313, 215 S. W. 672 (1919), also cited and distinguished
in the Durland case on the same basis as the-Paradies case. Irrespective of this distinguishing feature, the Compton case is weakened by the reasoning used. Two bylaws were adopted by the society, one precluding recovery by persons in certain employment (including aviators), and the other barring recovery for death in the
military service. Even though the two by-laws were worded practically identically,
the court held that the latter one applied only to new members while the former
applied to old and new members but did not affect the insured because employment meant civilian employment only.
'Green v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 144 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. ist, 1944).
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civilian aviation were entirely separate and distinct, and the fact that
the company's application did not mention military aviation showed
an intent on its part not to exclude this form of aviation hazard. In
overruling this contention, the court, pointing out that civil and military aviation were not separate and distinct but were overlapping, refused to read into the aviation clause an exception for military aviation. It came to the very logical conclusion that the insurance company was only interested in the risk of flying, and not the reason for
the flying. This same point was discussed and disposed of in Hyfer v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.1 3 Under an almost identical situation, the
plaintiff proceeded on the basis of ambiguity, but the Massachusetts
court declared:
"[This interpretation] is in direct conflict with its express language [the aviation clause] ....The absence of a provision excluding death due to war risks did not operate to engraft an
implied exception upon the unambiguous aeronautical clause,
which relates to the risk itself and not to the reason for the exposure ....It is fallacious reasoning to say that, because the policy failed to exclude liability for war losses in general, the scope
of the undertaking, which clearly did exclude certain aviation
deaths, is through such failure to be construed to comprehend
all war losses and so to cover war aviation of the excluded
kind."14
In a slightly different case, 15 a New York Supreme Court in 1946
followed the reasoning of the Green and Hyfer cases to deny plaintiff
a double recovery under a double indemnity clause which excluded
accidental death resulting from flight in any aircraft other than as a
farepaying passenger on commercial airlines. The court found, "that
the policy is not ambiguous in respect to aviation coverage."' 16
In another recent case1T in this series, the Kansds Supreme Court,
after an exhaustive review of the authorities, denied recovery, stating:
"Its language [the aviation clause] refers to flight 'in any spe1318 Mass. 175, 61 N. E. (2d) 3 (1945).
"4Hyfer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 Mass. 175, 61 N. E. (2d) 3, 4 (1945)
[italics supplied].
Another recently decided (although unreported) case on the same point, and
holding the same way is Douglas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 16 U. S. L. Week
2290 (N. D. Ohio 1947).
15Durland v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 Misc. 58o, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 700 (1946).
'5Durland v. New York Life Ins. Co., 186 Misc. 580, 584, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 700,
703 (1946)'17Knouse v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P. (2d) 31o

(1947)-
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cies of aircraft,' about as all-inclusive language as could be used.
We are not warranted in reading into this plain language, any
language and make it say somewords that would modify that
8
thing other than was said."'
Clearly the two lines of cases represent an irreconcilable split of
authority. The minority finds the policy ambiguous and then construes
it in favor of the insured, while the majority of cases finds no ambiguity
from the same facts. It would seem that the majority holding is the
more sound view. An insurance policy is a contract, and the terms of
the agreement should be observed by the courts, even if sympathy and
patriotic fervor call for the contrary. However, in view of the wellestablished tendency of courts to aid the insured at every opportunity
because of his inferior bargaining position, insurance companies must
attempt to make the language of the policies clear enough to avoid
controversies by stating that the aviation clause refers to both civilian
and military flying. Until this is done the insurers will continue to lose
a percentage of cases involving this point.' 9
T. HALLER JACKSON, JR.

INSURANCE-RiGHT OF DIVORCED WIFE To RECOVER AS BENEFICIARY OF
POLICY WHICH SHE PROCURED ON LIFE OF HUSBAND. [Kentucky]

With the recent decision of Ficke v. Prudential Life Insurance
Company of America,' the Kentucky Court of Appeals has taken a
step toward repudiating the confused and unique rules of law in that
state concerning the right of a divorced wife to recover as beneficiary
of an insurance policy on the life of her former husband. The plaintiff had procured several policies on the life of her husband, and had
paid all the premiums thereon out of her own funds. Thereafter, the
marriage was dissolved by divorce and the husband married another
woman, who in this action claimed the proceeds of the policies for the
estate of the deceased insured. Plaintiff sued for the proceeds, or in the
alternative, the amount she paid in premiums, with interest.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's petition, on the authority of
prior Kentucky cases2 applying a statute which provides that upon
'BKnouse v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa, 163 Kan. 213, 181 P. (2d) 31o,
317 (1947).
1
9Although there is no way to compel present policy holders to accept a rider
amending the aviation clause, it is possible that a great number of the holders would
voluntarily assent to such a rider if they were contacted by the company.
1305 Ky. 171, 202 S. W. (2d) 429 (1947).
2Schauberger v. Morel's Adm'r, 168 Ky. 368, 182 S. W. 198 (1916); Eversole v.
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obtaining a divorce, the parties must restore all property received from
each other by reason of the marriage.3 In reversing this judgment and
holding the plaintiff entitled to recover the proceeds of the policy,
the Court of Appeals expressly overruled its earlier decisions which
4
had established the contrary rule.
In those previous decisions it had been concluded that the interest
of the wife as beneficiary of an insurance policy on the husband's life
was property received by reason of the marriage, and thus came within
the mandate of the statute.5 In regard to policies taken out by the husband on his own life, naming the wife as beneficiary, this conclusion
may be obvious; and as that particular point was not involved, the
court in the principal case carefully avoided committing itself.6 Even
Eversole's Adm'x, 169 Ky. 234, 183 S. W. 494 (s9i6); Western and Southern Life Ins.
Co. v. Webster, 172 Ky. 444, 189 S. W. 429 (1916). In the first two decisions the proceeds of the policy were awarded to the estate of the deceased ex-husband, except
for the amount of the premiums which had been paid by the wife. The sum was
held to be recoverable by the wife as property received by the husband by reason of
the marriage, within the provisions of the Kentucky statute, cited note 3, infra. In
the last cited case, involving an annulment of an illegal marriage rather than a
divorce, the estate apparently had made no claim for the proceeds of the policy,
and the insurance company was held liable to the ex-wife only for the return of
premiums paid.
In view of these holdings, the action of the trial court in the principal case in
dismissing both the claim for the proceeds and the alternative claim for an amount
equal to premiums paid seems a departure from the precedents relied upon. However, in none of the cited cases did the amount of premiums paid approach the
face value of the policy, whereas in the principal case the plaintiff had paid more
in premiums on one of the policies than its face value. The Court of Appeals points
out that the previously adopted rule would require the peculiar result of charging
the deceased's estate more for the premiums paid than it would be awarded in the
form of the full proceeds of that policy. 3o5 Ky. 171, 202 S. W. (2d) 429, 430 (1947).
3Ky. Rev. Stat. (1946) § 403-060 (2): "Upon final judgment of divorce from the
bonds of matrimony, each party shall be restored all the property, not disposed of
at the beginning of the action, that he or she obtained from or through the other
before or during the marriage and in consideration of the marriage."
'Ficke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 3o5 Ky. 171, 202 S. W. (2d) 429, 432
(1947): "We have given very careful consideration to the problem presented here
and have concluded that our previous opinions have been erroneous. We have now
determined to follow the general rule and hold that where the wife has procured
and paid for insurance on the life of her husband during the marriage, subsequent
divorce does not abrogate the contract, and that she is entitled to continue to pay
the premiums after the divorce and collect the proceeds of the policy upon its maturity. Cases to the contrary are overruled."
5Eversole v. Eversole's Adm'x, 169 Ky. 234, 183 S. W. 494 (1916); Schauberger
*v. Morel's Adm'r, 168 Ky. 368, 182 S. W. 198-(1916); Sea v. Conrad, 155 Ky. 51, 159
S. W. 622 (1913).
Ficke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 305 Ky. 171, 202 S. W. (2d) 429, 431
(1947).
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where the wife had procured the policy and paid the premiums, the
Kentucky court had heretofore taken the same view, on the reasoning
that it was only by virtue of the marriage that the wife obtained an
insurable interest in the life of the husband. This questionable line
of logic gave effect, by implication, at least, to the unorthodox view
that the insurable interest in the life of another must exist at the time
of the loss as well as at the inception of the policy.7
That the countenancing of this minority view was done inadvertently is indicated by the fact that the Kentucky court has apparently
not applied it in other types of controversies. In one square adjudication on the point, it was held that where a stockholder procured insurance on the life of the general manger of the corporation, with the
stockholder as beneficiary, the existence of an insurable interest at
the inception of the policy was sufficient. 8 In permitting the plaintiff to recover in the principal case, the court expressly adopted that
general principle of insurance law as the rule in Kentucky.
This shift leaves Texas as apparently the only state requiring the
existence of an insurable interest at the time the insured dies. 9 The
Texas courts regard this rule necessary to prevent wagering contracts
and to avoid the creation of an inducement to homicide. It is argued
that if the interest terminates while the policy is in force, the temptation to take the life of the insured is just as great as if the interest had
never existed.' 0 This view is thus analogous to the general rule of property insurance which, as a means of discouraging the willful destruction of insured property, requires that the interest be present at the
time of the loss."
The Texas reasoning as to the prevention of homicide has been severely criticized by use of analogy to life estates in real property or testalFicke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 3o5 Ky. 171, 202 S. W. (2d) 429, 432
(1947).
6Sandlin's Adm'x v. Allen, 262 Ky. 355, 90 S. W. (2d) 350 (1936).
Patterson, Essentials Of Insurance Law (1935) 141: "... without going into detail, it may be safely asserted that no other state has consistently adhered to the
Texas rule." Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251
(1876); Rawles v. Insurance Co., 27 N. Y. 282, 84 Am. Dec. 28o (1863); Overhiser's
Adm'x v. Overhiser, 63 Ohio St. 77, 57 N. E. 965 (1900); Appeal of Corson, 113 Pa.
438, 6 At. 213 (1886); Marquet v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 Tenn. 213, 159 S. W. 733
(1913); Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894).
2OCheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894).
"Carpenter v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 16 Pet. 495, lo L. ed. io44 (U. S.
1842); Commercial Fire Ins. Co. v. Capital City Ins. Co., 81 Ala. 320, 8 So. 222
(1886); Clinton v. Norfolk Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 176 Mass. 486, 57 N. E. 998 (19oo);
Foley v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 152 N. Y. 131, 46 N. E. 318 (1897).
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mentary dispositions. 12 In Ritter v. Smith 13 the Maryland court stated,
"In some cases they [contracts of life insurance in which no
insurable interest existed at the time of loss] have been denounced as void, not simply because they tend to promote
gambling, but because they are incentives to crime. The force
of this latter suggestion has been, and may well be, doubted. It
means that one not related or connected by consanguinity or
marriage, who may have a direct pecuniary interest in the speedy
death of another, will thereby be tempted to murder him,
though he knows that hanging is the penalty for such crime.
This doctrine carried to its logical result, has a far reaching effect. It strikes down every legacy to a stranger which may become known to the legatee... before the death of the testator.
It makes void every similar limitation in remainder after the
death of a life tenant ....Yet we know of no case in which a
court has declared such testamentary dispositions or conveyances
to be void on this ground."
It is doubtful that human experience will support the Texas theory
as to the need for thus protecting human life. The penalty for the
commission of such a crime, if the offender is apprehended, is severe
enough to restrain the normal schemer. Further deterrent effect lies
in the fact that the moral wrong of taking a life is so much greater than
that of destroying property. Professor Patterson suggests still another
safeguard, in that "the consent of the cestui que vie affords sufficient
assurance that the beneficiary will be a person who may safely be entrusted to resist the temptation to murder."'14 By requiring the beneficiary to obtain the consent of the insured before procuring the policy
or continuing the policy after the divorce is granted, he believes that
the danger will be reduced to a "negligible minimum."
Reliance on the analogy of property insurance law as support for
the Texas rule has been questioned. It is pointed out that a property
insurance contract is one of indemnity, and there is no need to indemnify the insured if his interest in the property has terminated prior
to the occurrence of the loss.' 5 But a life insurance contract is not re' 2Union Fraternal League v. Walton, 1O9 Ga. 1,34 S. E. 317 (1899); Rittler v.
Smith, 70 Md. 261, 16 At. 890 (1889); Chamberlain v. Butler, 61 Neb. 730, 86 N.
W. 481 (0O); Crosswell v. Connecticut Indemnity Ass'n, 51 S. C. 1o3 , 28 S. E. 200
(1897).

'37o Md. 261, 16 Ad. 890,

891-2 (1889).
"'Patterson, Insurance Interest In Life (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 381, 392.
15Clinton v. Norfolk Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 176 Mass. 486, 57 N. E. 998 (1900):
"Inasmuch, however, as the contract of insurance is one of indemnity, and not a
wager, it is manifest that where, before the fire, the insured had parted with his
entire interest in the property insured, he suffered no loss by its destruction, and
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garded as one of indemnity, and hence it is not essential that the insurable interest should exist at the time the loss is incurred.16 It has
been said that a contract of life insurance is a "promise to, pay a fixed
sum of money, not measured in terms of the hardship or loss occasioned
by death. It is, therefore, a misnomer to call it an 'indemnity' contract."' 7
If this distinction is controlling, then in situations in which the relationship of the parties is such that an interest ascertainable in a liquidated amount arises in the continuance of the life of the insured, the
contract should be considered one of indemnity. In situations of this
type, as in those of property insurance, an insurable interest should
be required to exist at tht time of the loss. This principle seems applicable where a creditor insures the life of a debtor or in reinsurance
contracts, because it is obvious that such insurance is procured by the
beneficiary for the purpose of indemnifying himself in the event the
loss occurs,' 8 even though the insurer may be required to pay an

amount in excess of the loss. In such situations the extent of the insurable interest can easily be ascertained. If the relationship is of the debtor-creditor type, the beneficiary's interest would be the amount of the
debt plus interest; in a reinsurance contract, it would be the amount
of the original insurance policy plus the cost of the reinsurance. In the
event the amount recovered on the polity exceeds the insurable interest, this surplus should be transferred to the estate of the deceased.' 9
Upon the termination of the insurable interest, such as by the debt
being paid, the policy should become void; and the beneficiary, having paid the premiums on the policy, would become entitled to the
cash surrender value of the policy. The amount of the premiums paid
would exceed the amount thus recovered, but the difference is refer20
able to the protection the beneficiary has received.
needed no indemnity." Foley v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., 152 N. Y. 131, 134, 46 N.
E. 318, 319 (1897): ".... there must be an insurable interest in the insured ... existing
at the time of the happening of the event insured against, to enable him to maintain an action on a fire policy. This flows from the nature of a contract of fire insurance, which is a contract of indemnity; and, where there is no interest, there is
no room for indemnity."
"Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457, 24 L. ed. 251 (1876);
Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616, 2o L. ed. 5o (U. S. 1871); Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N. E. 299 (1912); Wurzburg v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 14o Tenn. 59, 203 S. W. 332 (1918).
"Patterson, Insurable Interest In Life (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 381, 388.
"SExchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, 1o4 Ga. 446, 31 S. E. 459 (1898) held that a
creditor insured the life of a debtor for indemnification purposes.
"Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh, 104 Ga. 446, 31 S. E. 459, 461 (1898).
^0Patterson, Insurable Interest In Life (1918) i8 Col. L. Rev. 381, 414: "...each
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In the cases in which dependents have insured the lives of their
providers, though the amount of the hardship on the beneficiary due
to the death of the insured cannot be exactly evaluated, the purpose
of the insurance is generally still indemnification against loss of support. While the courts have almost uniformly refused to recognize this
indemnity element of life insurance, it seems that this may be a rule
of expediency, designed to circumvent the difficult problem of determining the value of the insurable interest actually involved. In that
event, the distinction is purely superficial, and could well be abolished
in favor of the rule that in contracts of life insurance an insurable interest must exist at the death of the person insured.
It is true that the amount of the policy may far exceed the actual
economic value of the person insured to the named beneficiary, and
therefore a life insurance policy would not be a true indemnity contract. However, the policy may be treated like a valued property insurance policy "in which a definite valuation is, by the agreement of
both parties, put upon the subject-matter of insurance and written in
the face of the policy...."21 On this theory it becomes unnecessary to
compute the actual extent of the interest of a dependent in the life of
the party on whom he is relying for support.
However, to permit a divorced wife, who is no longer dependent
on the insured, to recover on a policy is an entirely different matter,
because here it is not a question of extent of interest but rather of lack
of interest. The insurance has been reduced to a pure wagering transaction which the law should have no desire to countenance. The interests of justice might be better served through restoring the parties
to their original position by requiring the insurance company to repay
the amount of the premiums paid since the divorce, plus interest, but
less a sum representing the reasonable cost to the company of handling the nullified policy.

22

premium represents two payments, one to cover the current risk, and the other to
maintain the policy reserve. As to the former, the insured [beneficiary] has received
full value, because the risk has been incurred .... As to the latter, the policy may
be fully protected by giving him his share of the reserve in the form of a 'cash surrender value; that is, as soon as his interest is terminated, he can be given his 'investment'."
"Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 193o) 44.
"It is perfectly competent for the parties to a contract of insurance to determine by prior agreement what shall be regarded as the value of the property insured ... and.., such valuation is the measure of recovery, even though it might
be proved that the actual value of the property lost is more or less." Vance, Insurance (2d ed. 1930) 77.
2The fact that the amount of the premiums to be repaid might exceed the

1948]

CASE COMMENTS

The position taken by the Kentucky Cou'rt of.Appeals in the principal case, though it brings that state in accord with the great weight
of authority, may thus have been a move in the wrong direction. Its
previous view, while unorthodox, may be better supported by reason
and more in accord with realities.
JAMES

0.

PORTER

LABOR LAw-AvAILABILITY OF INJUNCTIvE RELIEF AGAINST PEACEFUL
PICKETING UNDER ILLEGAL PuRPosE DOCTRINE. [Massachusetts]

The Massachusetts court's recent decision in Saveall v. Demers, exemplifies the reluctance of some states to accept the United States Supreme Court's classification of peaceful picketing as an exercise of the
constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech. 2 The plaintiff
owned and operated a barber shop in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, in
which he had no employees, but rather did all the work himself. The
defendant union, International Journeymen Barbers of America, Local 284, had about 40 members, over half of whom operated their own
shops and employed no one. Plaintiff having refused a request to join
the union or to raise his price to the union scale, the union began
picketing his shop, carrying signs reading, "This barber shop unfair
face value of the policy seems to have troubled the Kentucky courts. However, if
the purpose is to rescind the insurance contract and restore the parties to their
original positions, the principle is not changed by the relative amount of premiums
paid to face value of the policy. The difficulty comes in the further-and seemingly unwarranted-step of holding the estate of the deceased entitled to the proceeds
of the policy (subject to accountability for the amount of the premiums paid by the
ex-wife). The possibility of the estate's being charged with more than it would receive is thereby raised. Some authority is available for the view that if the beneficiary lacks an insurable interest, the estate of the insured can collect the proceeds
of the policy, See 2 Couch, Insurance (1929) 923; 29 Am. Jur. 291, and that even

where the insurance company has paid the proceeds to the beneficiary, the estate of
the insured can recover the money from the beneficiary. Howe v. Griffin, 126 Ky.
373, xo3 S. W. 714 (19o7); Riner v. Riner, 166 Pa. St. 617, 31 Atl. 347 (1895). But the
usual American view is that only the insurer may assert the want of insurable interest in the beneficiary. i Couch, Insurance (1929) 772; 29 Am. Jur. 291-292. There

appears to be no reasonable basis for allowing the deceased's estate to claim any
interest in the policy, where neither deceased nor the beneficiaries of his estate took
out the insurance or paid for it. This seems to be the incorrect factor in the previous
Kentucky view-not the refusal to allow the ex-wife to recover on the policy.
276 N. E. (2d) 12 (Mass. 1947).
7Thornhill v. Alabama, 31o U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940); Carlson v. California, 31o U. S. io6, 6o S.Ct. 746, 84 L. ed. 11o4 (1940); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. 855 (1941); Bakery and
Pastery Drivers and Helpers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 86, 86 L. ed. 1178
(1942); Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126, 88 L. ed.
58 (1943).
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to organized labor. The Fitchburg Barbers Union." The picketing was
peaceful at all times. Two men walked back and forth on the sidewalk
in front of the shop during business hours; no threats or interference
with customers occurred.
The trial court, finding that there was no labor dispute as defined
by the state anti-injunction statute,3 enjoined the picketing as an unlawful intereference with the plaintiff's business. The Massachusetts
Supreme Court affirmed, classifying the defendants' action as an unlawful combination to injure the plaintiff in his business. Defendants'
contention that the picketing could not be enjoined because it was an
exercise of the constitutionally protected right of free speech was rejected by the Massachusetts court with the assertion that picketing
"possesses elements of compulsion upon the person picketed which
bear little relation to the communication to any one of information or
of ideas," 4 and that a tortious act could not be made non-tortious
merely by calling it speech. The court concluded that "the defendants'
method of speaking involves an otherwise unlawful combination for
an unjustified objective and a form of compulsion which is not speech
and which strikes directly at the basic right of a man to use his hands
to earn his living."5
Although it is undeniably true that the picketing strikes at the
plaintiff's right to earn a living, and although the Massachusetts court
makes a strong case for its premise that "the essentials of free speech are
possible without destruction of other constitutional rights as fundamental to a free society as the right of free speech itself," 6 yet it is difficult •to see how such an injunction can be sustained in the face of
the United States Supreme Court's "free speech doctrine" as announced
in some half-dozen cases.
Prior to 1937 most courts allowed picketing only when carried on
in conjunction with a lawful strike. Labor disputes were considered
the business of the individual states, and picketing was subject to regulation or prohibition depending upon whether or not the union showed
sufficient justification for its acfion.7 Against this background came the
dictum of Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union8 implying that picketsMass. Gen. Laws (Ter. ed.) c. 149, § 2oC, as added by St. 1935, c. 407, § 1; c.
214, § 9A, as added by St. 1935, c. 407, § 4.
'76 N. E. (2d) 12, 14-15 (Mass. 1947).
'76 N. E. (2d) 12, 15 (Mass. 1947).
176 N. E. (2d) 12, 15 (Mass. 1947).
1i Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) § 136.
6301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857, 81 L. ed. 1229 (1937).
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ing was a form of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution 9
Three years later, in Thornhill v. Alabama,10 the Supreme Court implemented this dictum by holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment
no state could validly pass a statute prohibiting all picketing, because
such a statute would deny freedom of speech.
The following year, in American Federation of Labor v. Swing,"
"stranger picketing" was brought within the Thornhill case doctrine,
with the effect of nullifying the "no strike-no picket" common law
policy of Illinois.' 2 In this case the Supreme Court spoke of peaceful
picketing as if it were an absolute right,'3 but on the same day the
decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor
DairiesInc.14 was handed down, holding that the Illinois court could
enjoin peaceful picketing when such peaceful picketing was so enmeshed with acts of violence as to make further picketing coercive. 5
03o U. S. 468, 478, 57 S. Ct. 857, 862, 81 L. ea. 1229, 1236 (1937): "Members
of a union might, without special statutory authorization by a state, make known the
facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."
"B1o U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. ed. 1093 (1940).
"312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568, 85 L. ed. 855 (1941).
"Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91, 22 N. E. (2d) 857 (1939);
Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 3oi Ill. App. 607, 22 N. E.
(2d) 962 (1939); Hendrickson v. International Ass'n, 301 Ill. App. 6o8, 22 N. E. (2d)
969 (1939); Jaffe v. Auto Mechanics, 3oi Ill. App. 624, 22 N. E. (2d) 723 (1939).
In twelve other states (Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington) at the time
the Swing case was decided, picketing in the absence of a strike was outlawed. Subsequent to the Swing decision, five of these states (Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky,
New Jersey, and Washington) have authorized picketing in the absence of a strike,
either because of its identification with free speech or on other grounds. See 1
Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940 and Supp. 1947) § 117.
"3"The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a
particular state regarding the wise, limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the
state .... Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by
them to be relevant to their interests, can no more be barred because of concern for
the economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than
could the utterance protected in Tornhill's case." 312 U. S. 321, 325-326, 61 S. Ct.
o
568, 57 , 85 L. ed. 855, 857 (1941).
"'312 U. S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. ed. 836, 132 A. L. R. 1200 (1941).
"'It is interesting to note that the Illinois court did not enjoin the picketing
in the Meadowmoor case on this basis, but because such picketing was a secondary
boycott and an' unlawful interference with the plaintiff's business. The Illinois
court did not consider the violence a controlling element. Meadowmoor Dairies
v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939). Presumably
the Supreme Court seized upon the violence in this case in an effort to clarify and
qualify the "free speech doctrine" before it got out of control, for as pointed out
by Justice Reed in the dissenting opinion, 312 U. S. 287, 317, 61 S. Ct. 552, 566,
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Carpenters and Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe,16 decided in 1942, placed a further restriction on the "free speech doctrine"
by limiting the right to picket to the area of the industry within which
the labor dispute arises, 17 and by ruling that picketing of an establishment which industrially has no connection with the dispute may be
enjoined. In the course of that opinion the Court cast considerable
doubt upon the validity of the classification of picketing as free speech
by making a distinction between "picketing" and "other traditional
modes of communication."'18
Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers v. Wohl' 9 was decided the

same day as the Ritter's Cafe case. The New York courts had enjoined
picketing on the basis that no labor dispute existed as defined by the
state Civil Practice Act, 20 but the Supreme Court invalidated the injunction, declaring that "one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by state law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to express a grievance in a labor matter by publication unattended by
'2
violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive." '
And a further qualification of the "free speech doctrine" was expressed
in the opinion:
"... there are no findings and no circumstances from which we
can draw the inference that the publication was attended or

likely to be attended by violence, force or coercion, or conduct
85 L. ed. 836, 854 (1941), there were no findings that the union authorized or encouraged violence, nor did the union contest the right of the Illinois court to enjoin
acts of violence.
1L

315 U. S. 722, 62 S. Ct. 807, 86 L. ed. 1143 (1942).

"This limitation is comparable to the New York "Unity of Interest" concept.
Cf. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); People v. Bellows, 281 N. Y. 67,22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939).

"8"But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free speech does not
imply that the states must be without power to confine the sphere of communication
to that directly related to the dispute. Restriction of picketing to the area of the
industry within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants other
traditional modes of communication." 315 U. S. 722, 727, 62 S. Ct. 807, 81o, 86 L.
ed. 1143, 1148 (1942).

It was rather startling for the Court to maintain that picketing is free speech
and in the same decision allow freedom of speech, in the form of picketing, to be
restricted to the area of industrial conflict. This seems entirely inconsistent with
what was said in Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 3o8 U. S. 147, 163, 6o S. Ct. 146,
151, 84 L. ed. 155, 166 (1939) "... one is not to have the exercise of this liberty of

expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."
2315 U. S. 769, 62 S. Ct. 8M6, 86 L. ed. 1178 (1942).
'N. Y. Laws (1935) c. 477.
"315 U. S. 769, 744, 62 S. Ct.

8S6, 8M8, 86 L. ed. 1178, 1183 (1942).
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otherwise unlawful or oppressive; and it is not indicated that
there was an actual or threatened abuse of the right to free
speech through the use of excessive picketing. A state is not required to tolerate in all places and
all circumstances even
22
peaceful picketing by an individual."
In 1943, the New York court, thinking it had made the findings
referred to in the Wohl case as necessary for the issuance of an injunction, enjoined a labor union from picketing a cafeteria operated by
the owners without the aid of employees.23 The purpose of the picketing was to organize the establishment, but the pickets had carried
misleading signs, had told prospective customers that the cafeteria
served bad food and that customers of the cafeteria were aiding the
cause of Fascism, and had directed prospective customers to competitors' restaurants. The New York court found that the picketing was
unlawful and coercive and declared:
"...a citizen is not required to tolerate peaceful picketing accompanied by untruthful representations, interferences with his
business or coercive conduct designed to injure or destroy his
business whether a labor dispute exists or not. ... Unlike the
record in the Wohl
case, there are findings of fact here to sus24
tain the decree."
The United States Supreme Court, by a unanimous decision in Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 25 reversed the New York court and
refused to retreat further from the "free speech doctrine." The findings of unlawful and coercive acts were 4pparently rejected, and "the
right of workers to state their case and to appeal for public support
in an orderly and peaceful manner regardless of the area of immunity
as defined by state policy" 26 was reaffirmed. Evidently the implied limitations of the Wohl case proved to be an illusion. If it is true that "A
state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances
even peaceful picketing by an individual,"27 those places and circumstances are still to be determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States and not by the individual states themselves.
Thus it appears that the "free speech doctrine" in its present status
embraces the principles of the Thornhill, Swing and Wohl cases as
limited by qualifications expressed in the Meadowmoor and Ritter
-2315 U. S. 769, 755, 62 S. Ct. 819, 86 L. ed. 1178, 1184 (1942).
2Angelos v. Mesevich, 289 N. Y. 498, 46 N. E. (2d) 903 (1943).
A289 N. Y. 498, 502, 46 N. E. (2d) 903, 905 (1943) [italics supplied].
2320 U. S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126, 88 L. ed. 58 (1943).
'320 U. S. 293, 295, 64 S. Ct. 126, 127, 88 L. ed. 58, 60 (943).
7315

U. S. 769, 775, 62 S. Ct. 816, 819, 86 L. ed. 1178, 1184

(1942).
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cases: Peaceful picketing is an exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of speech, so long as the picketing is not so enmeshed with violence as to become coercive, and so long as the pickets
restrict their activities to the area of industrial conflict, "regardless
'2
of the area of immunity as defined by state policy.
Although the immediate objective of the picketing enjoined by
the Massachusetts court in Saveall v. Demers29 was to bring pressure
upon the plaintiff to raise his prices, the primary purpose was to enable the union shops to maintain their prices, and that could hardly
be considered an unlawful objective. The free speech decisions, particularly the Angelos case,8 0 would appear to embrace the facts of this
case, but the Massachusetts court, although paying some verbal homage
to these decisions, apparently declines to follow them. Instead, it continues to apply the unlawful purpose and civil conspiracy concepts as
tests for the legality of peaceful picketing, with the result that the
"free speech doctrine" has little effect on Massachusetts law.3'
The Massachusetts court is not alone in currently voicing protest
against the broad implications of the free speech decisions. The Supreme Court of Washington, in a 5 to 4 decision in Gazzam v. Building Service Employees InternationalUnion, Local 262,32 has done an

about-face in regard to stranger picketing. A hotel proprietor had refused to sign a closed shop agreement with the defendant union. His
employees had been given an opportunity to join the union, but had
declined to do so, and the proprietor contended that to sign a closed
shop agreement, thereby requiring his employees to join the union,
would be unlawful under the state labor code. When the union peacefully picketed the establishment, the proprietor brought an action for
damages suffered as a result of the picketing.
The Washington court not only allowed the plaintiff to recover
damages, but went further than was necessary to decide the issues of
the case by indicating that an injunction against further picketing was
nCafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S.293, 295, 64 S. Ct. 126, 127, 88
1. ed. 58, 6o (1943). See Teller, Picketing and Free Speech (1942(, 56 Harv. L. Rev.
i8o! Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply (1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 532; Jaffe,
In Defense of the Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine (1943) 41 Mich. L. Rev. 1037.
'76 N. E. (2d) 12 (Mass. 1947).
"0320 U. S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126, 88 L. ed. 58 (1943).
"'See Simon v. Schwachman, 3o Mass. 573, 18 N. E. (2d) 1 (1938); Quinton's
Market v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 21 N. E. (2d) 546 (1939); R. H. White Co. v.
Murphy, 31o Mass. 510, 38 N. E. (2d) 685 (1942); Fashioncraft Inc. v. Halpern, 313
Mass. 385, 48 N. E. (2d) 1 (1942); Colonial Press Inc. v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N. E.

1188 (P. (2d) 9947)97 (Wash- 1947).

(2d)
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a proper remedy and that such injunctive relief would be authorized
if requested.3 3 In the course of the opinion the court expressly overruled two 1941 decisions 34 in which injunctive relief against stranger
picketing had been denied solely on the ground that the Washington
court was bound by the United States Supreme Court's decisions that
peaceful picketing is constitutionally protected free speech.35 By overruling these earlier decisions and making available injunctive relief
against stranger picketing, the Washington court places picketing back
into the status it held prior to the United States Supreme Court's
"free speech decisions." Therefore, although peaceful picketing may
be constitutionally protected in that state, it loses such protection
when used in the furtherance of what is termed an unlawful labor
objective by the Washington court.
It seems possible that state courts which have for some time considered themselves unequivocally bound by the Supreme Court decisions are realizing the futility of attempting to explain the "free
speech doctrine" in the light of accepted principles of tort law, and the
recent decisions of the Massachusetts and Washington courts may
foreshadow a rising opposition to the classification of peaceful picketing as free speech. In future cases the United States Supreme Court may
be faced wiih a full force of hostile public opinion demanding a restriction of the broad rights of free speech picketing.
HUGH T. VERANO

nThe court sustained the plaintiff's contention that the state Labor Code made
a closed shop agreement unlawful; hence the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. 188 P. (2d) 97, 1o3 (Wash. 1947). It is interesting to note that the California
court reached the opposite conclusion in interpreting a similar statute. Shafer v.
Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal. (2d) 379, io6 P. (2d) 403 (1940).
3O'Neil v. Building Service Employees International Union, 9 Wash. (2d) 507,
115 P. (2d) 662, 137 A. L. R. 1102 (1941), and S & W Fine Foods Inc. v. Retail Delivery Drivers and Salesmen's Union, ii Wash. (2d)262, 118 P. (2d) 962 (1941).
nAlthough following the Supreme Court decisions in the O'Neil case, the
Washington court expressed a strong distaste for the "free speech doctrine." Chief
Justice Robinson in a concurring opinion said: "While I concur in the result of the
foregoing opinion, I desire to make it clear that I do not pretend to have arrived
at that result through the employment of any kind of intellectual process. In fact,
I agree with substantially everything that is said in the opinion of the dissenting
judges, but I feel compelled to follow the opinions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Swing case and the other so-called 'freedom of speech' cases
recently decided by that court." 9 Wash. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662, 664-665, 137 A.
L. R. 1102, 1105 (1941).
And in'a rather sharp dissenting opinion Judge Steinert said: "If this state of
affairs is the logical outcome of 'freedom of speech,' I would rather have the United
States supreme court so interpret the constitution than to have a part in thus declaring the law. If that is to be the law, then I think that the time has arrived
when we should have less speech and more freedom." 9 Wash. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d)
662, 666-667, 137 A. L. R. 11o2, iio8 (1941).
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NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-STATUS OF HOLDER OF INSTALLMENT NOTE
TAKEN AFTER MATURITY OF ONE OF INSTALLMENTS. [California]

The rule that the taker of a negotiable note after maturity is not a
holder in due course, and is thus subject to the personal defenses of the
maker is no longer open to question.' If a note is not paid at maturity,
it is considered dishonored, and such fact, appearing on the face of the

note, is equivalent to notice to the holder that he takes the note sub2
ject to inherent infirmities which may exist presently or subsequently.
This element of notice, established in the earliest cases,3 has been codified in Section 52 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Law as a requisite
for hdc status: "That he became the holder of it before it was overdue,
and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was
the fact .... "
It would seem that this reasoning would warrant the same result
where a series of notes, known by the purchaser to be given for the
same consideration, are transferred after the maturity of the first note;
thus the taker of any of the notes of the series would be precluded from
the hdc status. Under the law merchant rule it generally was held that
knowledge that the note was one of a series in which a note was
overdue was such a suspicious circumstance as would justify the jury
in denying hdc status to the taker.4 Since the adoption of the N.I.L.
and the trend towards achieving greater negotiability, a few courts
have reached a contrary conclusion. 5 In these cases it was held that un"'The rule of law that he who takes a note overdue and dishonored, takes it
encumbered with all the equities between the prior parties to it, is the law ... of
of those states which have adopted the common law." Foley v. Smith, 6 Wall. 492,
493, 186 L. ed. 931, 932 (1867); Fisher v. Leland, 58 Mass. 456 (1849); Emerson v.
Crocker, 5 N. H. 159 (1830); 1 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments ( 3 d ed. 1886) § 796,
and cases cited; Britton, Bills and Notes (1943) 497.
2"But where a negotiable note is found is circulation after it is due, it carries
suspicion on the face of it. The question instantly arises, why is it in circulation,why is it not paid? [There] is something wrong. Therefore, although it does not
give the indorser notice of any specific matter of defense... yet it puts him on inquiry...." Fisher v. Leland, 58 Mass. 456, 458 (1849).
3Brown v. Davies, 3 T. R. 8o, ioo Eng. Rep. 466 (1789).
'In the following cases it was held that a transferee who acquires notes forming a series, or a part of them, after one or more of the series had matured, did
not take As an hdc if it appeared on the face of the notes, or he had knowledge
that they formed a series. Old National Bank v. Marcy, 79 Ark. 149, 95 S. W. 145
(19o6); Stoy v. Bledsoe, 31 Ind. App. 643, 68 N. E. 907 (03); McGuigan v. Abele,
78 Mich: 415, 44 N. W. 393 (1889); Lockwood v. Noble, 113 Mich. 418, 71 N. W. 856
(1897); Rowe v. Scott, 28 S. D. 145, 132 N. W. 695 (1911); Harrington v. Claflin, 91
Tex. 294,42 S. W. 1055 (1897); Norwood v. Leeves, 115 S. W. 53 (Tex. Civ. App. 19o8).
5
Hobart M. Cable Co. v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170, 274 Pac. 665 (1928); Mountjoy
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less the purchaser had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect which
constituted the defense against the note, the mere knowledge that one
note of the series was overdue will not prevent his attaining hdc status
as to the other notes. These decisions, however, were not rendered
with reference to Section 52 of the N.I.L., but solely with reference to
Section 56, 6 and hold that knowledge that one of the notes was overdue, was not "knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the
instrument amounted to bad faith." 7 It seems that the arbitrary rule
requiring purchase before maturity was not regarded by these courts
as controlling.8 In the absence of legislation covering the situation,
such a viewpoint seems hard to sustain, for it is provided expressly in
Section 196 of the N.I.L. that in any case not provided for in the Act,
the law merchant shall govern.9
Parts Co. v. San Antonia National Bank, 12 S. W. (2d) 6o9 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928);
Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Co. 97 W. Va. 83, 124 S. E. 591 (1924). Contra:
Beasley Hardware Co. v. Stevens, 42 Ga. App. 114, 155 S. E. 67 (193o).
6
Section 56: "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect
in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom it is negotiated
must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
7
The overdueness and non-payment of one of a series of negotiable notes does
not constitute per se notice of infirmity in the notes to a purchaser in due course of
those not due. A purchaser is not precluded from the status of hdc due to the mere
suspicion of an infirmity. Strong and obvious facts and circumstances, pointing to
an infirmity, might impute bad faith in a passive purchaser who fails to make prudent inquiry. But the rights of a holder are determined by honesty and good
faith, and not by such speculative standards as negligence or diligence. See Morgan
v. Farmington Coal & Coke Co, 97 W. Va. 83, 124 S.E. 591, (1924).
6This point was recognized in Beasley Hardware Co. v. Stevens, which held
contra to the cases cited in note 5, supra: "These decisions were not rendered with
reference to the provisions of Section 52 of -the Negotiable Instrument Law, but
were rendered solely with reference to Section 56." 42 Ga. App. 114, 155 S. E. 67,
71 (193o).
0In Beasley Hardware Co. v. Stevens, the result was reached on such basis.
"Section 4287 of the Civil Code of 1g, which purports to be only a codification of
a rule of the law merchant, or of the common law in force in this state, must, since
it announces a rule of the law merchant or the common law as respects a situation
which is not covered or provided for in the Negotiable Instrument Law, be taken
as expressing the rule obtaining in this State." 42 Ga. App. 114, 155 S. E. 67, 71,
(1930). The logic of the court has met with approval in Note (1930) 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 464, and Note (1931) 15 Minn. L. Rev. 585, 586: "And since the Negotiable
Instrument Law expressly provides that in any case not provided for in the act the
rules of the law merchant shall govern ....the court proceeded to apply that rule
and hold that the purchaser was not a holder in due course. It would seem that
this interpretation has considerable merit." In Note (1930) 64 A. L. R. 457, a
reference to the cases cited in note 5, supra, and which were decided solely with
reference to Sction 56 of the N. I. L., states: "The rule established by the reported
case (Hobart M. Cable Co. v. Bruce,...) appears to be supported by a minority of
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A different and controversial problem is presented in regard to the
status of a transferee of an installment note after the maturity of one
or more of the installments, yet before the due date of the remaining
installments. In the recent case of Bliss v. CaliforniaCo-Op Producers,10
the makers of installment notes had a personal defense of fraud and
failure of consideration, such defense having developed after the plaintiffs purchased the notes. At the time of purchase there had been default in the payment of an installment of principal, and defendants
pleaded that the plaintiffs were not hdc's under Section 52 (2) of the
N.I.L. and consequently took the note subject to the defense of the
maker. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiffs on the finding
that they had acquired the notes in good faith and without notice of
any defenses of the defendants." °The Supreme Court of California
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for retrial only on the
issue of notice of non-payment of the first installment at the time of
transfer. If it should be found that plaintiffs had notice of non-payment of an installment of principal, judgment was to be entered for
the defendants; otherwise, the plaintiffs would be hdc's, and the verdict
would be in their favor. Two judges dissented, arguing that such a
view would greatly impair the negotiability of installment notes, and
that notice of non-payment was totally irrelevant as to the status of
the purchaser, since each installment was to be treated as a separate
2
note and default as to one would have no bearing on the others.'
Earlier cases were unanimous in the rule that where an installment
note containing an acceleration clause was purchased after the maturity date of an installment, the note was "overdue as to its entirety,"
and the holder was precluded from claiming the rights of an hdc.1s
the decided cases involving that question. It has the support of West Virginia, and
apparently one Texas case supports the rule, the courts of that state being in an
apparent conflict."
1°181 P. (2d) 369 (Cal. 1947).

uThis view of the trial court seems consistent with the view expressed by the
series note cases cited in note 5, supra. The former holds that notice or knowledge
of an installment default is irrelevant in determining the status of the holder with
regard to future installments; the latter holds that notice or knowledge of the default in a note of a series is irrelevant in determining the status of the holder of
the unmatured notes of the series. Both views contend that the controlling factor
is the good faith of the purchaser.
12
Bliss v. California Co-Op Producers, 181 P. (2d) 36 9, 383 (Cal. 1947). This
seems precisely the view expressed by the trial court. See 'note i , supra.
3Hall v. E. C. Wells & Son, 24 Cal. App. 238, 141 Pac. 53 (1914); Stoy v. Bledsoe,
31 Ind. App. 643, 68 N. E. 907 (19o3). It was held in Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84,
io8 N. W. 212, 213, si6 Am. St. Rep. 938 (19o6), under a clause providing that an
interest default should "cause the whole note to immediately become due and col-
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Although such a view may be regarded as correct in a technical sense,
the weight of modern authority is to the effect that the purchaser of
such an instrument after acceleration can rely on the ultimate due
date if he has no knowledge of the installment default, and thus he
14
can be deemed to be an hdc as to later installments.
A slightly different question is presented in the case of a non-acceleratory installment note. Many cases have upheld the strict view
that a purchaser after the default of a principal installment cannot
be deemed an hdc under either the common law or Section 52 (2) of
the N.I.L. because such paper was "overdue" at the time of transfer.' 5
But in view of the trend of efforts to enhance negotiability of installment notes, and of legislation providing that one overdue installment does not render the paper in default in its entirety, contrary conclusions have been reached. There is now strong authority that the
taker in good faith and without actual notice of the non-payment of an
installment of principal is an hdc as to the future installments.16
This latter position, which was taken by the majority of the California court in the principal case, is consistent with other phases of installment note law which have been liberalized to permit greater negotiability of such instruments. It is well recognized that the bona
fide purchaser for value is within the protection of the law merchant
although an interest installment is overdue and unpaid at the time of
lectible," that a failure to pay interest rendered the note automatically due, and a
purchaser after such default was not an hdc.
"Taylor v. American National Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678, Ann. Cas. i 9 i4 A,
309 (1912); Britton, Bills znd Notes (1943) 504, and cases cited. "It is hardly necessary to state that a holder without notice of either default or exercise of the option
is not affected by the acceleration provision." Chaffee, Acceleration Provisions in
Time Paper (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 770 1'Vinton v. King, 4 Allen 562 (Mass. 1862); Field v. Tibbets, 57 Me. 358, 99 Am.
Dec. 779 (1869); Hibbard v. Collins, 127 Me. 383, 143 At. 6oo (1928); 8 C. J. 41o n.
14, and cases cited. "The reason of the rule is that, where one or more of the installments remain due, the presumption arises that there is some valid reason for
the failure or refusal to pay, which, if established, would likely go to the defeat of
the entire debt, and thus all subsequent purchasers or holders of the discredited
paper are put on inquiry." McCorkle v. Miller, 64 Mo. App. 155, 156 (1895). 1 Daniel,
Negotiable Instruments ( 3d ed. 1886) § 787: "If the note be payable by installments,
it is dishonored when the first installment becomes overdue and unpaid, and he who
takes it aftenvard takes it subject to all equities between the original parties."
laUnited States v. Capen, 55 F. Supp. 81 (D. C. Vt. 1944); Reed v. West Loan &
Trust Co., 22 Ga. App. 397, 95 S. E. 1002 (i9x8); "Where the principal of a note
is payable in installments and one installment is overdue and unpaid at the time of
transfer of the note, the transferee is not a holder before maturity and hence is not
a holder in due course, unless he does not take with notice of the past-due installment." io C. J. S., Bills and Notes § 313.
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purchase. 17 Since the interest is but a mere incident to the debt, it is
but a fact for jury consideration concerning the purchaser's actual
knowledge of an existing defense that the purchaser knew of the
actual default and non-payment of interest at the time of transfer.' 8
The absence of recordation on the note itself of installment payments
made is not per se evidence of actual knowledge of a default or of a
defense, but is also mere evidence to be considered with other factors
for determination by a jury of the good faith of a purchaser. 19
The dissenting opinion in the Bliss case has recognized the liberalized commercial trend in installment notes, and advocates pushing
the rule to a further point of commercial expediency whereby even
notice of default on past installments shall have no bearing on the
status of the taker as to future installments. By this view, the taker
would be an hdc as to the part of the note not yet matured, unless it
could be shown that he had actual notice of the defenses against the
enforcement of the note when it was purchased.
Thus there appear to be three possible conclusions which the
courts might reach, and the choice as between them turns less on operation of law and reason than on the promotion of commercial advantage. From a standpoint of business usage the first view must be rejected as imposing too strict limitations on negotiability, by unduly
penalizing a holder who had no particular reason to suppose that some
installments were in default, and no ready means of determining that
a default had occurred. The intermediate view, as adopted by the
majority of the court in the principal case, seems to represent the
more usual trend of the modern decisions. It enhances the negotiability of the note, yet the maker is still well protected. Notice of de'-City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity &Deposit Co., 1o5 F. (2d) 348, 123 A. L. R.
1352 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939); Britton, Bills and Notes (1943) 456; 1 Daniel, Negotiable
Instruments (3 d ed. 1886) § 787 and cases cited.
"SBritton, Bills and Notes (1943) 455: "While the cases were in conflict on this
question at common law, and possibly may continue, there is little dissent at the
present time from the rule that knowledge that interest is due and unpaid does not,
of itself, constitute bad faith, but such fact may be taken into consideration by the
jury along with other facts on the issue of purchase in good faith." A purchaser
of an instrument before maturity with knowledge that interest was due and unpaid, was held not to be a purchaser in bad faith in McPherrin v. Tittle, 36 Okla.
510, 129 Pac. 721, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) 395 ('913), and in Higby v.Bahrenfuss, i8o Iowa
316, 163 N. W. 247 (1917).
""In all these situations, the holder must have notice of the default. The absence of any indorsement on the instrument that installments have been paid in not
per se notice and does not subject a purchaser to equities. It is, however, evidence
of notice." Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (igig) 32 Harv. L. Rev.
747, 769, and cases cited.
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fault in an installment principal payment or notice of a defense precludes a taker from the hdc status, and the question of whether the
taker had or should have had notice under the circumstances is for
jury consideration in each case. This view of the majority of the court
is precisely the same as is adopted by the American Law Institute in
its proposed Final Draft of the Commercial Code: "The purchaser
has notice that an instrument is overdue only if he has reason to know:
-20
(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue ....
The view of the dissenting judges in the principal case finds no support in decided cases, unless authority can be drawn from the minority
view of the series note cases in which the purchaser had knowledge of
the maturity of one of the serial notes, yet maintained his hdc status
as to those notes not yet due.21 It can well be argued in the serial note
cases that the maker, in executing separate instruments, must have
contemplated their falling into separate hands, and cannot rightly
expect termination of negotiability of all at the maturity of the first.
This reasoning cannot be applied to installment notes, however, and
the maker's protection would be unduly hindered if the series note
rule were invoked in such cases. Fraudulent payees could easily transfer the notes after an installment default to those who knew of the de'fault, and who would not be duty bound to inquire of the maker.
The maker would then have a difficult task of proving the taker's
actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect which constituted the defense, as notice of an installment non-payment would be irrelevant.
Thus, his defenses are considerably lessened; and, although greater
freedom of negotiability is desired, the safeguards of a maker must
be maintained to a reasonable standard.
The dissent, nevertheless, illustrates a persistent tendency of the
law. Courts are constantly striving to further the cause of negotiability,
particularly in series and installments notes. However, in the light of
the contrary position taken in Section 3o6 (4)of the proposed Commercial Code, it is most unlikely that such a view will be adopted in
installment notes. But the uncertainty as to series notes defaults might
still exist, for the Code has no provision for that situation. It can be
argued that this.omission implies the independence of each note of
a series, and strengthens the minority rule that knowledge of a de-IA.
L. I. Commercial Code: Proposed Final Draft No. i (Apr. 15, 948) Art.
III, § 3o6 (4).
"See cases cited in note 5, supra. This point is discussed in notes uL and 12,
supra.
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fault in one series note will not deprive the taker of other notes of the
same series of the hdc status. Such a distinction between series and
installment notes could be well founded, and in the absence of provisions in the Code concerning the series notes, that aspect of the question will continue to be a source of litigation.
CARTER C. CHINNIS

TORTs-LIABILITY

INSURANCE AS AFFECTING

A CHARITABLE

CORPORA-

TION'S IMMUNITY FROM TORT LIABILITY. [Illinois]

In attempting to determine what effect the existence of liability
insurance should have upon the tort liability of a charitable institution, an Illinois appellate court, in the recent case of Wendt v. Servite
1
Fathers,
has injected a new element of uncertainty into one of the
most confused segments of American law. A five year old boy who was
2
injured while playing on the premises of the charity sued for damages.
The institution carried a general liability insurance policy under which
the insurance company would pay up to $1o,ooo to any person to whom
the Servite Fathers might become obligated because of liability imposed on the institution. The policy provided that the insurer would
not use the defense of immunity unless requested to do so by the institution, and that any waiver of the defense by the institution would
not subject the insurer to any amount of a claim in excess of the
$1o,ooo limit.3 It did not appear that the Servite Fathers had requested

that the defense be used, but it was nevertheless invoked by the insurer; 4 however, this violation of the contract terms as between insurer
and insured seems not to have been given much weight by the court in
determining to impose liability on the defendant charitable institution. The decision was stated in unqualified terms:
"We hold that where insurance exists and provides a fund
from which tort liability may be collected so as not to impair
the trust fund, the defense of immunity is not available." 5
1332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N. E. (2d) 342 (1947), noted (1948) 36 Ill. B. J. 488.
2
The plaintiff's allegation that the institution's stadium was an attractive nuisance maintained in an unsafe condition was sustained.
alt is interesting to note that in the Wendt case the plaintiff waived all right
to levy his execution upon the real estate or other assets of the charitable corporation.

'It is assumed in Note (1948) 36 Ill. "B. J. 488, 490. that the defendant-charity

did authorize the use of the defense. However," the court in the instant opinion
stated: "There is nothing in the record to indicate that any such request [to assert
the defense of immunity] was made." 332 Ill. App. 618, 634, 76 N. E. (2d) 342, 349
(1947)5332 Ill. App. 618, 634, 76 N. E. (2d) 342, 349 (1947).
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In view of the fact that the insurance contract called for payment
by the insurer only upon the condition that the insured charity would
become obligated to pay first, it would seem necessaryfor the court
to have found this prior obligation on the part of the defendant. The
rule in Illinois for some forty years has been, however, that a charitable institution is absolutely immune from tort liability; 6 and, up to
the time of the Wendt decision, that rule seems not to have been
changed by the fact that the institution was insured. This view was
clearly stated in 1945 in Piper v. Epstein7 where the court, while
weighing very logically the effect of the existence of insurance, observed that the policy "was procured to protect the hospital, not to
enlarge its liability." s
The same view as to the effect of such insurance seems to prevail
generally in other jurisdictions, 9 the vast weight of authority being
that where liability is not first imposed by law upon the charity, then
the existence of insurance will not create a right of action or impose
liability or additional liability.10
The validity of the principal decision is open to further question on
the ground that it violates the intended import of the insurance contract. As previously indicated by one Illinois court,"1 such policies are
presumably taken out for the protection of the charity, and not to neutralize the defense of immunity. To allow liability to grow out of the
existence of insurance is to rewrite the insurance contract so that, instead of being for the benefit of the two contracting parties, it becomes
a contract between the eleemosynary institution and the insurance
6

Parks v. Northwestern University,

218

(1905); Tollefson v. City of Ottawa, 228

Wesley Hospital, 17o Ill. App. 81

(1912);

Ill. 381, 75 N. E.

991, 2

L. R. A. (N.S.) 556

I1. 134, 81 N. E. 823 (19o7); Armstrong v.
Johnston v. City of Chicago, 258 Ill. 494,

N. E. 960 (1913); Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E.
'461 (1929); Saffron v. Y.M.C.A. of Chicago, 317 Ill. App. 149, 45 N. E. (2d) 555 (1942);
Lenahen v. Ancilla Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N. E. (2d) 445 (1947).
1236 11. App. 40o, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945). The Appellate Court in the Piper
case was also from the First District. It sat, however, for the First Division while
the court deciding the Wendt case was that of the Second Division.
8326 Ill. App. 40o, 62 N. E. (2d) 139, 144 (1945).
914 C. J. S. 550.
"Ayers v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., io6 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 5 th,
1939); Hughes v. Hartford Accident 9- Indemnity Co., 223 Ala. 59, 134 So. 461
(1931); Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick, 213
Ky. 355, 3 S.W. (2d) 753, 62 A. L. R. 721 (1928); Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 17o N. E. 43 (1930); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore,
156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465, 67 A. L. R. 1 o6 (193o); Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospiof Kansas City, 187 S. W. (2d) 469 (Mo. App. 1945)tal Ass'n
2
Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 4oo, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945).
101
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company for the benefit of third persons, and no insurance contract
at all.

12

If the policy involved is a contract of strict indemnity, rather than
one of general liability, even greater doubt is cast on the creation of
liability because of the existence of insurance. In such case, the insurance company "is not liable thereon until loss or damages have
actually been suffered by the assured, and.., the amount of the insurance does not become available until the assured has paid the loss
or damages."13 Had the policy in the Wendt case been one of strict indemnity, the Illinois court might have been restrained from finding
liability because that court acknowledges that it is bound by the full
immunity doctrine of Parks v. Northwestern University'4 which was
based on the avoidance of impairment of the trust fund. Under a pure
indemnity agreement the trust fund must necessarily be impaired
temporarily because the insured must first pay before it can recover
its insurance. There is an obvious possibility that the trust fund might
become permanently impaired in the event that the indemnitor should
have some valid defense of its own against the insured defendant who
had already satisfied the tort judgment.
Apart from the issue of the coverage of the contract, there is still the
question of whether as a matter of policy the existence of liability insurance should vary the immunity status of charitable institutions. In
the few states 15 which hold that the charitable corporations are as
liable in tort "as though they were operating for profit, and [that]
the problem of tort-liability is no different than in the case of any
other corporation,"'16 the existence of insurance is obviously immaterial
in regard to the charity's tort responsibility.
While it is true that the majority American rule is against imposing total liability on the charity, 7 that majority embraces degrees of
immunity varying from complete to very limited,' 8 and where imnStedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass'n of Kansas City, 187 S. W. (2d) 469,
471 (Mo. App. 1945).
"Hagerhorst v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 3o F. Supp. 152,
156 (E. D. Mo. 1939).
"' 218 Ill.
381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 556 (905).
"Prosser, Torts (1941) 1085.
"'Harper, Torts (1933) 655.
171n England, the rule is total liability. Prosser, Torts (1941) 1084.
"Until the Wendt decision, Illinois allowed complete immunity. Another rule
is that the defense of immunity is not available when the plaintiff is a stranger to
the charity. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D.
C. 123, 13o F. (2d) 810 (1942). A third rule permits judgments against the charities
but prohibits the levying of an execution on them. Both Colorado and Tennessee
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munity is granted, in full or in part, a number of theories are employed
in justification. The Illinois court, in arriving at the Wendt decision,
points out the four general theories used to find exemption from liability for the charity: the trust fund theory, the inapplicability of re9
spondeat superior, the waiver theory, and public policy.V
It may well be argued that the need for concern for the preservation of the trust fund completely vanishes when the charitable institution is insured. Those courts which refuse to impose liability because
to do so would be to put the donor's gift to a purpose for which it was
never intended lose sight of the fact that insurance nullifies this reasoning by providing protection against impairment of the trust fund.
All well-run institutions must carry fire and theft insurance as a normal operating expense, and it seems only reasonable that tort liability
insurance should be considered in the same light.2 0 Even if the pay-

ment of premiums by the charity is deemed a diversion of the trust
fund, that dissipation is an accomplished fact, and allowing a judgment against the charity which will be paid by the insurer works no
further impairment. All that the policy of the law requires is that the
funds and property held in trust cannot be diverted, 21 and an Illinois
court has already condoned the payment of premiums, in the Piper
case.

22

A second reason given for exempting charities from tort liability is
the fact that they derive no profit from the work of their servants and,
therefore, should not have to bear the loss caused by the torts of these
servants. Insurance, however, counterbalances this argument for immunity just as it does the trust fund theory. The charity does not have
to bear the loss of damages out of its property when it is insured.
The existence of insurance seems to be irrelevant to the third basis
have such a rule. Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass'n of Kansas City, 187
S. W. (2d) 469 (Mo. App. 1945). Louisiana allows the injured party to bring suit
directly against the insurer and the defense of immunity is held to be personal to
the charity itself. Lusk v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., i99 So. 666 (La.
App. 1941). A fifth view is that recovery may be had against the eleemosynary institution, but only against that property which is not used in the charity itself.
Robertson v. Executive Committee of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 19o
S. E. 432 (1937). For a general discussion of immunity rules, see Note (1947) 4
Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 241.
"332 Ill. App. 618, 623, 76 N. E. (2d) 342, 344 (1947).
"Prosser, Torts (1941) 1082: "...with the development of liability insurance,
it seems unlikely that donors would fail to recognize it as a legitimate expense of
operation...."
"Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.)
556 (905).
2326 IlL. App. 4oo, 62 N. E. (2d) i39, 144 (1945).
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for granting immunity, the waiver theory. This theory holds that one
who accepts the benefits of the charity assents to the fact that he will
not be compensated for any harm that befalls him while so doing. Under facts similar to those in the Wendt case this theory is totally inapplicable; and under any set of facts to which this theory is applicable, there seems to be no sensible basis for arguing that a patient
waives the right to recover if the hospital has no insurance but does
not waive the right if the hospital is insured.
The final argument for granting the defense of immunity is simply
that of public policy in the encouragement of charitable enterprises.
Where liability insurance exists, it may well be to the greatest interest
of the public in general that liability of the charity be created, because
in this way the work of the charity remains unimpaired while the injured individual is recompensed for his suffering.
Because it is possible that insurance may create liability, the eleemosynary institutions now enjoying full immunity or immunity against
a certain class of claims or plaintiffs are faced with the extremely provocative question of whether to insure or not. Under any rule of immunity, the contracting on the part of the charity for an insurance
policy to cover liability from which it is immune may be seriously questioned as being an unnecessary expenditure. There are, however, several reasons why an institution, even in a full immunity jurisdiction,
might find it wise to insure against tort liability. In the first place, in
view of current trends in this field of the law, there is forever the possibility that liability may be imposed tomorrow where immunity exists
today. The Illinois court in the Wendt case criticizes the immunity rule
so severely that the impression is created that, if it had the power to do
so, that court would abandon the rule of complete immunity in favor of
a rule of total liability, without passing through even one of the intermediate stages. Another cause for the fully or partially immune charity
to carry liability insuraice is that the policy almost always provides for
the defense of suits against the assured, and proving the defense of immunity could easily involve enough litigation to make insurance a
very economical measure.23 At least one court has said that the undertaking to defend actions against the insured is sufficient consideration
for the premiums paid by it.24 A third reason why the institution,
sure of no liability, might insure is simply that it feels a moral obli21See
24

Note (1948) 36 Il1. B. J. 488, 490.
Ayers v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., io6 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A.

1939)

5 th,
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gation. In all probability the Servite Fathers had been motivated
by such a consideration, which explains the presence of the clause that
the immunity defense was not to be invoked unless the insured so requested. The building and perpetuation of good will outside the walls
of these charitable institutions is almost as important to their existence as the doing of good on the inside.
JAMES C. HOLLORAN, JR.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF PARTY CAUSING FIRE TO PERSON INJURED WHILE
ATTEMPTING To SAVE THREATENED PROPERTY. [New Hampshire]

In the field of negligence law, the problem of determining the
existence or absence of a legally recognized duty has challenged the
analytical powers of courts and writers. It has been aptly observed
by one authority, "that the problem of duty is as broad as the whole
law of negligence, and that no universal test for it has been formulated. It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion.... [and] is not
sacrosanct in itself but only an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection....1' This authority then condudes, "Perhaps no better general statement can be made, than that
the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable men would
'
recognize it, and agree that it exists.

2

Representative of one segment of negligence law in which the
resolution of the duty problem is traditionally in conflict with the
sympathies of the reasonably prudent layman is the recent case of
Glines v. Maine Central Railroad Co.3 The New Hampshire court

denied recovery to the plaintiff who was injured in fighting a fire
threatening the premises owned by his mother, the fire having been
started as a result of the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff
having been summoned to the scene by his nephew. The court declared that, "there is no evidence that the plaintiff had any existing
legal interest in his mother's property which would entitle him to
'Prosser, Torts (1941) i8o; Professor Winfield in summarizing as to the duty
concept in tortious negligence states: "As to the usefulness of the idea in theory it
might well be eliminated from the tort of negligence, for it got there only by a

historical accident and it seems to be superfluous." Winfield, Duty In Tortious
Negligence (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 41, 66.
2Prosser,
Torts (1941) 18l; Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (1928)
28 Col. L. Rev. 1014, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 255.
352 A. (2d) 298 (N. H. 1947).
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rights not enjoyed by a volunteer, or impose upon him any duty to
minimize the damages occasioned by the defendant's negligence ....
The plaintiff's injuries may fairly be said to have resulted from a
4
risk which he voluntarily encountered."
The course of the court's reasoning and the nature of the decisions cited as authority5 clearly indicate that the widely recognized
policy of the law here invoked generally restricts recovery to persons who hold a proprietary interest in the property being threatened
by the fire which defendant has negligently caused. This basis of
the rule is further demonstrated by the cases which do allow recovery for injuries suffered by one having ownership interests. 6 In
Illinois C. R. Co. v. Siler, the leading decision in this line of authority, the following principle was stated:
"Even though one's property has been negligently set on fire by
another, the owner can not permit it to be consumed without
an effort to save it and then claim reimbursement from the setter out of the fire. He must use every reasonable effort, con7
sistent with his personal safety, to preserve the property."
The decision that no duty runs to volunteers who attempt to
'Glines v. Maine Cent. R. R., 52 A. (2d) 298, 3o (N. H. 1947). The court carefully pointed out that the plaintiff did not reside on the threatened premises, had
no authority over the property nor any responsibility for it.
5illinois Cent. Railroad Co. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 39 o , 82 N. E. 362, 15 L. R. A. (N.s.)
81g, nl Ann. Gas. 368 (1907) held it was the duty of the decendent to make all
reasonable efforts to arrest the fire so as to save her house when she saw the fire
approaching her dwelling; Makay v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 16o N. C.
260, 75 S. E. io8i (1912) holding that it is the right and duty of an owner to make
every reasonable endeavor to save his property from destruction and allowing plaintiff to recover where intestate had been burned to death while trying to beat back
a fire negligently started by defendant and which was threatening land and dwelling owned by the intestate; Wilson v. Northern Pac. Railroad Co., 3o N. D. 456,
153 N. W. 429, L. R. A. 1915E 991 (igi5) holding that the wife of a homesteader
has such a proprietary interest in the home as to raise a duty to protect it from
fire negligently caused by defendant and to recover for injuries suffered in fighting
the fire.
OGlanz v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., l19 Iowa 6ni, 93 N. W. 575 (1903);
Leavenworth Coal Co. v. Ratchford, 5 Kan. App. 150, 48 Pac. 927 (1897); Harvey
v. Illinois C. R. Co., 159 Ky. 492, 167 S. W. 875 (914); Illinois C. R. Co. v. Thomas,
109 Miss. 536, 68 So. 773 (1915); Cooper v. Richland County, 76 S. C. 202, 56 S. E.
958 (19o7); Temple Electric Light Co. v. Halliburton, 136 S. W. 584 (Tex. Civ. App.
1911); 38 Am. Jur. Negligence Sec. 81.
7229
Ill. 39 o , 82 N. E. 362, 363 (1907). And in Wilson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co.,
3o N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429, 432 (1915) it was stated, "Plaintiff could certainly recover damages if all of the property were her own for her loss of time and services in fighting the fire, and this is on the theory of the duty of reducing the damages, if on no other."
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save threatened property appears to be one of the "shorthand statements of a conclusion" which characterize duty rules.8 And the
policy consideration which prompts this conclusion in this situation is probably the reluctance of courts to open their dockets and
exterfd their administration 9 to the multitudinous claims that might
be asserted against persons who, in their socially utilitarian activities, do inevitably cause occasional injury to others. As the law
is now generally applied, the casual rescuer of property is not accorded legal justification for taking the risk to his personal safety
which his morally commendable actions involved. 10 This risk is
justifiable at law when taken by the owner-rescuer, however, on the
basis of his "duty" to the defendant to avoid the consequences of
the latter's wrong as far as reasonably possible."1 Since this obligation of mitigation of damages rests only on those who would have a
cause of action against the defendant for damages to the threatened
property, persons without a proprietary interest are logically ex12
cluded from recovery under this theory.
8Some of the courts employ "proximate cause" terminology to state the same
conclusion as the principal case reached by the duty approach. Recovery is denied
in those decisions on the "reasoning" that the plaintiff's voluntary intervention
rather than the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. One
form of statement of the no-liability ruling seems no more convincing than the
other. E. g., Pike v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 39 Fed. 255 (C. C. D. N. H. 1889); Crowley v. City of West End, 149 Ala. 613, 43 So. 359 (19o7); Logan v. Wabash R. Co., 96
Mo. App. 461, 7o S. W. 734 (1902); Allison v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 257
S. W. 959 (Tex. civ. App. 1924); Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co., 65 Tex. 274, 57
Am. Rep. 602 (1885); Prosser, Torts (1941) 18o.
OSee Green, The Duty Problem In Negligence Cases (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014,
1035.
"°In Clark v. Boston & M. Railroad, 78 N. H. 428, 1o1 Ad. 795, 796, L. R. A.
1918A (1917) cited and relied upon in the principal case the defendant railroad's
freedom from liability to a municipal fireman injured while endeavoring to extinguish the fire was rested upon the absence of any duty owed to the plaintiff.
The court said, "As to the intervener the defendant's previous conduct is wrong
only in the. sense that it is a wrong to society at large. It may be a moral wrong
and may be punishable on behalf of the public; but it is not a private legal wrong
to individual members of the public, who of their own motion undertake to lessen the evil effects of the defendant's dereliction from duty. The Good Samaritan
could not recover from the thieves the value of the oil and wine which he poured
into the wounds of the man at Jericho. His recompense is the same today that it
always has been."
"Illinois C. R. Co. v. Siler, 229 IIL 390, 82 N. E. 362 (19o7); MeKenna v. Baessler, 86 Iowa 197, 53 N. W. 103 (1892); Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 8o N. D.
456, 153 N. W. 429 (1915).
"In Pike v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 39 Fed. 255, 257 (C. C. D. N. H. 1889), where
plaintiff went 40 or 5o rods to where the fire was set and was killed in fighting it,
the court said, "Mrs. Pike had no legal or equitable interest in this property, and
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While most of the courts have consistently maintained this restrictive policy, the limitation has been disregarded on occasion,
usually without any clear recognition that a departure is being
made.' 3 Obviously, the proprietary interest required to justify the
rescue attempt need not be complete ownership. It has been held
that a plaintiff whose interest was confined to a wife's homestead
rights in the premises could recover for her injuries sustained in
fighting defendant's fire.14 Further, an employee of the owner of
the threatened property was allowed recovery on the reasoning that
the employee and owner in trying to prevent the destruction were
doing, "... not only what the law authorized but what their duty

to the defendant required... ."15 People who live on the premises
owned by others and suffer injuries while seeking to save the property have been granted damages against the negligent originator
of the fire. And the Iowa court, in sustaining such a recovery, expressly denied that the right against the defendant was dependent
upon a "legal liability" of the plaintiff to attempt a rescue. A much
broader basis for defendant's duty to non-owners was declared:
"So far as we are advised by the record, he was under no legal
obligation to protect the property of his neighbor; yet his attempt to do so was entirely lawful, and was most praiseworthy.
If he had failed to make a reasonable effort to save it, he would
have merited the censure and contempt of his neighbors; and
this would have been so notwithstanding the fact that defendant may have been liable for loss which could occur, and that
what he accomplished would inure to its benefit."'16
consequently
was her duty
13Liming
Northern R.

in this action her administrator cannot invoke the principle that it
to approach the fire, and endeavor to put it out."
v. Illinois C. R. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (i890); Berg v. Great
Co., 7o Minn. 272, 73 N. WV.648 (1897); Wilson v. Great Northern

Pac. Ry. Co., 3o N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429 (1915). In each of the above cases the
proximate cause factor was emphasized in the opinions.
"'Wilson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 3o N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429 (1915).
'Berg v. Great Northern R. Co., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648, 649 (1897). The
court made no distinction between the owner and the employee of the owner in
speaking of the duty owed, and in holding the defendant liable to both parties, declared, "This doctrine has been held and applied under so great a variety of circumstances that we shall only cite two cases in which it has been applied to 'fire
cases' like the present ..... (One of the two cases cited was not in point, as no
rescue question was involved.) But it cannot be said that if the employee had failed
to endeavor to reduce the damages which the fire would cause, the defendant would
be allowed to cut down the owner's recovery for damage to his property; yet this
is what is inferred from the court's opinion. The most logical explanation of the
inclusion of the employee within the ambit of liability is the mention of proximate
cause and casual connection to which the court referred.
"Liming v. Illinois C. R. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (i8go). So far as can
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Such reasoning sheds a revealing light upon the weakness of the
narrow approach more generally taken by American courts which
refuse to recognize that the socially desirable conduct involved in
preserving property should be encouraged.
This social policy has long led the law to allow recovery to a person who is injured in an effort to rescue another person from danger
caused by the defendant's negligence.' 7 Recognition of the rescuer's
right rests basically upon the policy of promoting efforts to save the
precious commodity that is human life,' 8 and no personal relationship or legal responsibility between rescuer and rescued is required
in these cases. Property, while perhaps not quite so highly regarded
as life, is nevertheless given such vigilant protection by the law as to
indicate that society has a strong interest in its preservation. And
placing liability for injuries to a non-owning rescuer on the defendant who menaces property does not extend his responsibility beyond the bounds of reasonable foreseeability. 19 The conduct of the
rescuer, short of rashness and recklessness, arises from normal human reactions. As indicated by one court:
"It is the duty of everyone, according to the requirements of an
enlightened and just public sentiment, to use reasonable efforts
to preserve the property of others from threatened destruction;
and, as is well known, it is a duty which people generally are
quick to discharge. Defendant could have foretold, with almost absolute certainty, when it set the fire in question, the
plaintiff, being near, would use every reasonable means in attempting to save Ortman's horses from the flames, and there
20
was nothing surprising or unusual in the attempt he made."
Further argument for the fairness of imposing this form of liabe determined the soundness of this decision or the reasoning contained therein
has been neither criticised or questioned.
2'Pennsylvania Co. v. Roney, 89 Ind. 453, 46 Am. Rep. 173 (1883); Linnehan v.
Sampson, 126 Mass. 506, 3o Am. Rep. 692 (1879); Wagner v. International R. Co.,
232 N. Y. 176, 13 N. E. 437, 19 A. L. R. i (19i2); Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43
N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871). See Note (1947) 4 Wash. and Lee L. Rev. 235.
SIn the leading case of Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 506, 3 Am.
Rep. 721, 723 (1871) in discussing the deceased's efforts to rescue a child the court
said: "The law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute negligence
to an effort to preserve it, ...[but where a person acts] ...in the mere protection of
property, knowingly and .voluntarily to place himself in a position where he is
liable to receive a serious injury, is negligence, ... but when the exposure is for
the purpose of saving life, it is not wrongful, and therefore, not negligent,..";
Condiff v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co., 45 Kan. 256, 25 Pac. 562 (1891).
'"Page v. Bucksport, 64 Me. 51, 18 Am. Rep. 239 (1874); Cooper v. Richland
County, 76 S.C. 202, 56 S. E.958 (19o7); note (1929) 64 A. L. R. 515, 517-518.
2'Liming v. Illinois C. R. R. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66, 68 (189o).
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bility on the defendant is the fact that to the extent the rescuer
succeeds in saving the property from destruction, defendant is benefited by being relieved of paying damages to the owner. If he is to
receive this benefit, it seems not unjust to require him to bear the
risk of injury to a rescuer who acts within the limits of reasonable
prudence.
Most courts continue to reject these arguments for extending
the defendant's liability to cover injuries to volunteers with no legal
or personal interest in the endangered property. However, such contentions have been frequently accepted in support of the recovery of
22
2
employees of the owner ' or non-owning occupants of the premises.
It is not clear why they do not apply as aptly to the case of a careful and prudent volunteer. And this seems especially true where
the volunteer, as in the principal case, has a personal concern for
the interests of the owner of the premises. That the son has a moral
responsibility to render such services to his mother, that there is a
strong social pressure on him to do so, and that his efforts to that
end are clearly to be anticipated in the situation involved are all
obvious and beyond question. So far as sympathetic appeal is concerned, the plaintiff-son's position in the New Hampshire case is
certainly as strong as that of the non-owning occupant of the
premises or of the incidental employee of the owner. As far as administrative difficulties in adjusting such claims are concerned, it
is not clear wherein these cases would be any more burdensome to
the courts or treacherous for juries than the general run of negligence litigation.
BERNARD LEVIN

ToRTs-RES

IPSA LOQUITUR DOCTRINE AS DEVICE FOR IMPOSING LIA-

BILITY WITHOUT FAULT. [California]

Since the rule of res ipsa loquitur was introduced into the law by
Byrne v. Boadle' in 1863, there has been little dispute that two basic
2'Berg v. Grant Northern R. Co., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648, (1897); Chatta(1902).
nooga
2 Light & Power Co. v. Hodges, 1o9 Tenn. 331, 70 S. W. 6

Liming v. Illinois C. R. Co., 81 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (189o).

1

H. & C. 722, 727, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 301 (Ex. 1863), Pollock, C. B.: "The
present case" upon the evidence comes to this, a man is passing in front of the
premises of a dealer in flour, and there falls down upon him a barrel of flour. I
think it apparent that the barrel was in the custody of the defendant who occupied
the premises, and who is responsible for the acts of his servants who had the con-
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factors control the applicability of the rule: (i) the thing which caused
the injury complained of must have been under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and (2) the accident must have been
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management or control use proper care. Given these factors,
res ipsa loquitur affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose
2
from the defendant's negligence in the absence of other explanation.
Beyond this point, however, confusion arises in the American decisions, 3 resulting in at least three diverse views as to the effect of the
application of the doctrine: (i) There is a basis for a permissive inference4 of negligence to be drawn by the jury; (2) In the absence of
rebutting testimony from the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to
have the court direct a verdict for him; (3) In case the defendant does
introduce rebuttal testimony, the defendant is required to assume the
burden of persuading the jury of his freedom from negligence by a
preponderance of evidence.5
Assuming that the plaintiff has proved the elements of a res ipsa
loquitur case, under any of the three views the next move is up to the
defendant. If the jurisdiction applies the "permissive inference of
negligence" rule, the defendant of course may either let the case go
to the jury without evidence or submit evidence of the cause of the
accident. In either event the question is one for the jury.6 But if the
jurisdiction has adopted the second or third rule, the problem is pretrol of it; and in my opinion the fact of its falling is prima facie evidence of negligence, and the plaintiff who was injured by it is not bound to show that it could not
fall without negligence, but if there are any facts inconsistent with negligence it
is for the defendant to prove them."
-For many cases approving this view, see 45 C. J. 1193.
3lt should be noted that individual jurisdictions often vary in their choice of
effect to be given res ipsa loquitur. For citations of jurisdictions applying each type
of effect see 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 25o9.
"As used in this comment, inference "means that the inference of negligence
to be drawn from the circumstances is left to the jury. They are not compelled to
find it. The plaintiff escapes a nonsuit, or a dismissal of his case; but no burden
of introducing evidence is cast upon the defendant, in the sense of a directed verdict
against him if he fails to do so...." A presumption "always requires a directed
verdict for the plaintiff if the defendant offers no evideice to meet it." Prosser,
Torts (1941) 303, 304.
"Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in California (1937) io So.
Calif. L. Rev. 66, 171-173. For other excellent discussions of these three effects given
res ipsa loquitur see Prosser, Torts. (1941) 302; Harper and Heckel, Effects of the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 724; Prosser, The Procedural
Effect of Res Ip~a Loquitur (1936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 241.
8
Prosser, Torts (1941) 3o3. See also Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 240, 33 S.
Ct. 416, 418, 57 L. ed. 815, 819 (1913).
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sented as to what proof is required for rebuttal. The great weight of
authority holds that only the burden of producing evidence or going
forward is shifted to the defendant. The burden of proof in the sense
of the burden of non-persuasion should not be shifted and remains on
the plaintiff.7 This splitting of the "burden of proof" results in un-

certainty and confusion when the effect of the defendant's testimony
8
is considered.
Illustrating this difficulty is the recent case of Dierman v. Providence Hospital et al.,9 in which the California Supreme Court divided
4-to 3 on the problem of what is required of the defendant to avoid
suffering a directed verdict in a res ipsa loquitur case. The plaintiffpatient brought an action against the hospital and attending physicians and nurses for injuries sustained from an explosion of an anaesthetic gas. Two separate gases were to be used in different phases of
the operation, because the first phase required use of an electric needle
and a non-inflammable gas for anaesthesia, in the present case nitrous
oxide. During the second phase ether, an inflammable gas, was scheduled for use. The explosion occurred during the first part of the operation.
Both the majority and the dissenting justices agreed that the
plaintiff made out a good case of res ipsa loquitur. 10 Upon all the
testimony only four possible causes of the explosion were shown: the
needle ignited (i) ether, (2) nitrous oxide contaminated by unclean
apparatus, (3)nitrous oxide contaminated previously by the hospital,
or (4)nitrous oxide contaminated at the time of purchase. The defendants introduced evidence to contravene negligence on the first two
points. No definite evidence was produced on points three or four, although some testimony was adduced of general care in the operating
room.
7Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 646: "There is no reason why the
risk of persuasion should be shifted and that the defendant... should be forced
to convince the jury that the facts as proved establish a preponderance of probability
in favor of his innocence." 38 Am. Jur. ioo8: "The doctrine does not have the
effect of shifting the burden of proof, as distinguished from the burden of evidence,
or ...the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion, as distinguished
from the burden of going forward with the evidence; all the defendant need do is
produce exculpating evidence of equal weight."
8Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1937) 1o So. Calif. L. Rev.
166, 186. For evidence that disagreement on this matter extends to the writers as
well as the courts, see the heated discussion of Professors Carpenter and Prosser
in (1937) so So. Calif. L. Rev. 166, 459 and 467.
0188 P. (2d) 12 (Cal. 1947).
"'The court here relied on Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P. (2d)
687, 162 A. L. R. 1258 (1944) (personal injuries received during operation).
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The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, but the Supreme
Court's decision in effect held that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant
will not be held blameless unless he shows either: (i) a satisfactory
explanation of the accident and his lack of fault, or (2) such care in
all respects that the accident could not have happened from want of
care but must have been due to some unpreventable cause, although
the exact cause is unknown. The care shown must be satisfactory in
the sense that it covers all causes which due care on the part of the
defendant might have prevented."
The dissenting justices argued that since the explosion might have
resulted from causes other than negligence, and since the jury was
convinced that the defendants used due care, defendants had sustained
the burden imposed on them. They also point out that evidence on
the third possible cause would be difficult if not impossible to ascertain, so that in effect, the court is compelling the defendant to prove
12
the actual cause of the accident to escape liability.
Under this decision, then, the burden on the defendant is to prove
either (i) the cause of the accident and his non-negligence, or (2) his
due care in regard to every possible cause of the accident. If he does
not do both, a verdict is to be directed against him.
The lack of agreement among the courts on this question is indicated by comparing a strikingly similar case 13 in which the same anaesthetic was being used and an explosion occurred when an electric
cauterizer was applied. As in the Dierman case, the defendant was unable to explain the cause of the explosion, introducing only general
evidence of due care on some of the possible causes. The jury rendered
a verdict for the plaintiff. The appellate court conceded that "the
cause of the explosion is left largely to conjecture and speculation. Defendants made no effort to explain the explosion, but contented themselves by showing that proper machines were being used.... and the
operation carried on in proper manner,... and that they did not

know why the explosion occurred."'14 Nevertheless, the judgment for
the plaintiff was reversed, and defendant was held to. be entitled to a
directed verdict. The court reasoned that "To say,... that defendants
were: under the obligation to see that the gases contained in these re. UDierman v. Providence Hospital et al., 188 P. (2d) 12, 15 (Cal. 1947), citing
Bourguignon v. Peninsular Ry. Co., 40 Cal. App. 689, 181 Pac. 669 (igig).
-'Dierman v. Providence Hospital et al., 188 P. (2d) 12, 17 (Cal. 1947).
'3Wilt v. McCallum, 214 Mo. App. 321, 253 S. W. 156 (1923).
"'Wilt V. McCallum, 214 Mo. App. 321, 253 S. W. 156, 159 (1923).
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ceptacles did not contain any foreign substance, would be placing
upon the defendants the burden of exercising more than ordinary
care."15
Neither of these decisions seems satisfactory. One imposes an extremely severe burden of proof on the defendant, where proof is virtually unavailable. The other practically bars the plaintiff from the
benefits of res ipsa loquitur, excusing the defendant on a mere showing
6
that he employed the usual methods.'
The difficulty in obtaining any real "rule" for such situations has
two bases: first, it is difficult to tell which of the three effects of res
ipsa loquitur the court follows, since there is frequently a split of
opinion within a jurisdiction; 17 and, second, there seems to be a growing inclination, based on public policy, to impose liability somewhat
easily when the defendant is insured,1s as is nearly always the case
with hospitals and carriers, two frequent sources of negligence actions.
This tendency apparently has influenced the California court in
the Dierman case. Although the original ground for res ipsa loquitur
was that proof of what happened was more available to the defendant
than to the plaintiff so that he should come forward, this court extends
the doctrine to a case in which proof is practically unavailable to
either party. Thus, in the present case there were four possible causes
of the accident. The first two were eliminated by the evidence. On the
third possibility only general and vague testimony was offered; the
facts were such as could not be discovered by the plaintiff and could
be produced only with the greatest difficulty on the part of the defendant. On the fourth possibility, for which, if it was the cause, defendants would not be liable, no evidence was introduced.
The court holds that since no definite evidence was produced on
the third possibility, nearly impossible and highly dubious as it would
be, the court will presume it would have been adverse to the defen"Wilt v. McCallum, 214 Mo. App. 321, 253 S. W. 156, 160 (1923). The implications of this decision were expressly espoused by a Canadian court which held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable in an explosion case during an
operation, in the absence of evidence establishing how a burn was caused and the
extent of the defendant's liability. The underlying theory seems to be that a person being operated upon submits himself to the risk of danger from complicated
machinery, and that the surgeon is not an insurer of the patient's safety. McFadyen
v. Harvie, (1941) 2 D. L. R. 663, (1941) Ont. L. R. go.
"Pendergraft v. Royster, 203 N. C. 384, 394, 166 S. E. 285, 290 (1932). Other
cases on this point are collected in Note (193o) 65 A. L. R. 1028.
"See note 3, supra.
'1 Prosser, Torts (1941) 305; James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments (1946) 55 Yale L. J. 365.
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dant,19 and thus require a directed verdict against him. Such a view
ignores the chance that the accident was caused by the fourth possibility, for which defendant is not responsible.
The explanation for the result reached in this case may well be due
to a growing tendency to impose liability without fault in extra
hazardous undertakings, 20 the feeling being that the defendants are
usually in a better position to pay for damage caused. Whatever the
independent merits of such a trend, it would be much less confusing
to take the matter of absolute liability out of the already bewildering
law of presumptions.
The lengths to which a court will go in requiring evidence from
the defendant, and indeed, the choice of which of the three general
effects of res ipsa loquitur to apply, frequently depends on what appear
to be the probabilities of the case.21 If from the plaintiffs evidence
the probabilities of negligence are strong, the doctrine will be applied
without hesitation and the court is inclined to give it the effect of a
presumption, even shifting the burden of non-persuasion if there is
the additional factor that public policy would so be served.22 If,, on
the other hand, the probabilities are not as strong, should res ipsa
loquitur even be used, the court is more likely to give it the effect of
a mere inference.
It is submitted that if such a rule were adopted, in time negligence
cases would become classified 23 as to the formula of res ipsa loquitur
"Dierman v. Providence Hospital et al., 188 P. (2d) 12, 14 (Cal. 1947).
2'In this connection, Bohlen takes notice of "a growing tendency to ...compromise between the modem theory of tort liability as based exclusively on fault and
the more modem renaissance of the ancient concept that every one must answer
for the harm done even by his most innocent acts, by not only raising the presumption of negligence upon the mere fact of harm done, but by holding that such
presumption requires the defendant to rebut it by proving that he has done all
that is possible to prevent the harm that his activities has caused." Bohlen, Studies
in the Law of Torts (1926) 647.
"'For a similar conclusion, see Note (1935) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 126, 131.

2"Courts should and do get all the light they can on the questions of probability. They are not likely to invoke the rule unless there seems a fair chance that
the probabilities are as they assume. But the initial decision must often be made
without much light, and the real problems are who should have the burden of
shedding whatever light is available, and whether defendant's enterprise or its
victims should bear the cost of injury from unexplained accidents . .

.

. The Cali-

fornia courts have been keen to recognize this and to invoke the doctrine without
much regard to the matter of probability where the policy of the situation was felt
to demand it."
James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments (1946) 55
Yale L. J. 365, 390.

=However, James thinks there is no way of setting a scientific standard as to
"probability," and that it is "a matter of dealer's choice, and the court is the dealer."
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to be applied, according to the probabilities generally present in such
cases. This would be a valuable aid to both trial courts and attorneys
involved in res ipsa loquitur situations.
0. T.

KAYLOR, JR.

TRUSTS-ALLOCATION OF LIQUIDATING DIVIDENDS BETWEEN LIFE BENEFICIARY AND REMAINDERMEN. [Kentucky]
In the common type of trust agreement providing that the income
shall be paid to one beneficiary for life and that, on his death, the
principal shall be paid to other beneficiaries, a problem arises as to
the distribution of extraordinary dividends on corporate stock constituting the corpus of the trust. Whether these dividends are to be
treated solely as principal, solely as income, or are to be allotted proportionately between income and principal, has long been a subject of
debate. In regard to extraordinary dividends declared from accumulated earnings of a corporation as a going concern, there have arisen
in American courts three clearly conflicting rules.
First, there is the Massachusetts Rule,' which seems to be growing
in favor in America today. 2 Under this rule an extraordinary dividend
is allotted to corpus if it is in the corporation's own stock, but is allotted to income if it is in cash, the stock of another corporation, or if
the trustee has the alternative of taking stock or cash.3 This rule is also
James, Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments (1946) 55 Yale L. J. 365,
388. Perhaps the result would not be so arbitrary if the courts frankly admitted
that such a classification was followed.
'The Massachusetts rule was developed in the case of Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass.
lO (1868).
22 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 236.3; 4 Bogert, Trusts (1935) § 857; Notes (1935) ii Ind.

L. J. 175; (1941) 13o A. L. R. 492, 522; (1936) 1ol A. L. R. 1379, 1382; (1931) 72 A.
L. R. 981, 982; (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1287, 1289.
The Massachusetts rule has also been incorporated into § 5 of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act which had, in 1946, been adopted with some changes
in fourteen states, including the state of Pennsylvania, where the Pennsylvania rule
had its inception, 20 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1930) § 3475; and the state of Maryland which was previously committed to the Pennsylvania rule, Md. Code Ann.
(Flack, 1939) Art. 75B §§ i-io. However, in Pennsylvania in 1947, many sections
of the Act, including the section adopting the Massachusetts rule, were repealed,
and because of this substantial change, the remaining sections were entitled the
"Principal and Income Act of 1947" rather than the "Uniform Principal and Income Act'" It would seem very likely, therefore, that the courts of Pennsylvania
will again return to the rule of apportionment which they developed.
3

Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. ioi, io8 (1868): "A trustee needs some plain principle
to guide him; and the cestuis que trust ought not to be subjected to the expense
of going behind the action of the directors, and investigating the concerns of the
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4
essentially in line with the modern English rule.
Second, there is the Pennsylvania Rule, 5 which was formerly the
majority American rule; however, today the jurisdictions adhering to
the Massachusetts rule are probably about equal in number.6 The
courts following this rule have set up a system of apportionment between principal and income, whereby that portion of the extraordinary
dividend, whether it be in cash or stock, which was earned subsequent
to the commencement of the life estate is declared income to the life
beneficiary, and that portion of the dividend which was earned prior
to the inception of the life estate is considered principal."
Third, there is the Kentucky Rule, s which is followed only by the
courts of Kentucky and in principle by the courts of Delaware. 9 Here
no inquiry is made as to when the earnings accrued in relation to the
beginning of the trust, and all dividends paid from accrued earnings
are allotted to income payable to the life beneficiary without regard

corporation, especially if it is out of our jurisdiction. A simple rule is, to regard
cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as
capital."
As stated in a later Massachusetts case, D'Ooge v. Leeds, 176 Mass. 558, 56o,
57 N. E. 1025 (19oo): "Everything is made to turn upon the action of the corporation."
"In England prior to 1887, all extraordinary dividends were held to be capital;
however, Bouch v. Sproule, L. R. 12 A. C. 385, 57 L. T. (N.s.) 345 (1887) adopted a
rule which is very similar to the Massachusetts rule, holding that the purpose of
the corporation is the controlling factor as to whether the dividend is to be income
or capital.
5This rule was clearly set out for the first time in Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368

(1857).
62 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 236.3, where it is asserted that there was formerly a
preponderance of authority in favor of the Pennsylvania rule, but that the trend is
toward the Massachusetts rule. However, the Pennsylvania rule is adopted by the
Restatement, Trusts (1935) § 236, with the provision that stock rights are to be
treated as principal whether exercised or sold. For a very exhaustive treatment as
to the relative authority in support of each of the three rules, see Notes (1941) 130
A. L. R. 492; (1936) 1O A. L. R. 1379; (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1261; (1931) 72 A. L. R.
981; (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1532; (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1287; (1927) 50 A. L. R. 375; (1923)
24 A. L. R. 9 .
7
A later Pennsylvania court stated that the object of the rule is "to preserve
the value of the corpus as it was at the date of the death of the testator, or, to use
a more convenient term, to preserve the intact value of the estate." In re Nirdlinger's
Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 139 Ad. 200, 203 (1927).
$This rule was laid down by the Kentucky court in Hite's Devisees v. Hite's
Ex'r, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778, 19 L. R. A. 173 (1892).
'Bryan v. Aikin, io Del. Ch. 446, 86 At. 674 (1913), where the court, after a
consideration of the English, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania rules, reached a result
in accord with the Kentucky rule even though that rule was not expressly adopted.
For later Delaware cases following the Bryan case, see note io, infra.
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to whether these dividends be in stock or cash, or whether they be
ordinary or extraordinary. 10
There has been a considerable shifting from one rule to another by
a number of the state courts and legislatures," indicating that none
of the three rules has proved entirely satisfactory. The Pennsylvania
rule appears to be the most fair and equitable, but it runs into many
obstacles in practice, 12 especially in the field of stock rights. Also, apportionment of the income of a large modern corporation in reference
to its being earned before a certain date may involve complex accounting research with great expense and delay, and if the trustee does
not go to such length, he runs the risk of improper payment. On the
other hand, the Massachusetts rule, while it is easily applied and does
achieve some apportionment, embodies a standard which is arbitrary
and irrelevant to the issue of whether the life beneficiary or remainderman is entitled to the dividend. The Kentucky rule is perhaps the
most vulnerable to attack, in that it is purely arbitrary and its application often results in a serious reduction of the trust corpus and dissipation of the remainderman's interest. This is especially true if the
rule is applied to liquidation dividends.
"2Cox v. Sellers, 28 A. (2d) 679 (Del. Ch. 1942) [reversed on appeal on the
ground that the testator by his will had manifested an intention that his interest
in the corporation should be held intact for ten years, Cox v. Sellers, 33 A. (2d) 548
(Del. 1943)]; Ortiz v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 18 Del. Ch. 439, 159 AtI. 376
(1931); Du Pont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 At.

149 (1927); Bryan v. Aikin, io

Del. Ch. 446, 86 At. 674 (1913); Hubley v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S. W. (2d) 83o,
ioi A. L. R. 1359 (1935); Lightfoot v. Beard, 23o Ky. 488, 20 S. W. (2d) 90 (1929);
Goff v. Evans, 217 Ky. 664, 290 S. W. 490 (1927); Cox v. Gaulbert, 148 Ky. 407, 147
S. W. 25 (1907); 2 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 236.3.
11

For example, New York first followed the Kentucky rule, In re Kernochan,

1o4 N. Y. 618, 11 N. E. 149 (1887), then later the Pennsylvania rule, In re Osborne,
2o9 N. Y. 45o, 103 N. E. 723 (1913). But in 1926, by statute, it adopted the Massa-

chusetts rule in reference to stock dividends, N. Y. Laws 1926, c. 843, N. Y. Personal
Property Law § 17a.
Also, in Rhode Island it is held that extraordinary stock dividends are always
principal under the Massachusetts rule, but that extraordinary cash dividends are
apportionable under the Pennsylvania rule. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v.
Tucker, 51 R. I. 507, 155 At. 661, 83 A. L. R. 1253 (1931). On a reargument of the
same case, 52 R. I. 277, i6o Atl. 465 (1932), the court instructed the trustee to sell
stock in a corporation which had declared only stock dividends and no cash dividend, and to reinvest in a proper trust investment. Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Co. v. Peckham, 42 R. I. 365, 107 At. 209 (1919); 2 Scott, Trusts (1939) §§ 236.3,
236.4.
1The complexity of apportionment in some cases is shown by the decision of
In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Ad. 200 (1927), where the court held that

the lower court erred in awarding to the life tenants 3,1 1o,868/3o, 3 3 o,647ths instead
of 3,11o,868/6,o6o,8ooths of the $855 dividend paid to the trust.
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The weakness of the Kentucky rule, and its inefficiency as a tool to
cope with the problem presented where liquidation dividends are
declared on stock held in trust is brought out in the recent Kentucky
case of Laurent v. Randolph.13 The testator, who had died in 1935,
had established a testamentary trust under which his widow was to
receive a life interest, and upon her death there was a life interest to
his children with an absolute remainder over to the heirs of the children. Among the assets of the trust was a block of bank stock with a
par value of $ioo per share and a paid-in surplus of $20 per share. In
1946, the bank decided voluntarily to liquidate its assets and discontinue business, and the assets were ordered sold for distribution to
stockholders. The trustee, who was also the first life beneficiary,
brought this suit as trustee and in her own name for a declaratory
judgment as to the proper distribution of the dividends. The chancellor adjudged that the trustee took $120 per share, representing the
original paid-in capital and surplus, as corpus of the trust, and that
she took in her own right, as life beneficiary, all the proceeds in liquidation which may exceed $120 per share. At the time of suit, $225 had
already been paid on each share and the liquidation was not yet complete. This appeal was prosecuted by the remaindermen to reverse the
judgment.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's judgment, but it is interesting to note that this affirmance was made not
entirely on the basis of the Kentucky rul e. In writing the opinion for
the court, Justice Knight stated a strong preference for the Pennsylvania rule as the most fair and equitable of the three, but indicated
that the court would not be required to decide whether it should depart from the Kentucky rule because "the life tenant would be entitled to the distribution referred to under any of the three rules....-14
The courts of America are not only in conflict as to which of the
above mentioned rules should be applied generally, but there is also a
disagreement among them as to whether they will apply their particular rule to liquidation dividends. These jurisdictions which follow
the Pennsylvania rule15 or the Kentucky rule16 usually do apply these
13o6 Ky. 134, 206 S. W. (2d) 480 (1947).

uLaurent v. Randolph, 306 Ky. 134, 206 S. W. (2d) 480, 483 (1947).
'1McKeown's Estate, 236 Pa. 78, o6 At. 189 (1919); Lewis' Estate, 44 D. & C. 413
(Pa. 1942); Estate of Mathews, 21o Wis. 109, 245 N. W. 122 (1932); Estate of Gerlach, 177 Wis. 251, 188 N. W. 94 (1922).
8Hubley v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S. W. (2d) 83o, io A. L. R. 1359 (1935); Du-

Pont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 At. 149 (1927). See, however, Oritz v. Fidelity-
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principles to liquidating dividends the same as they apply them to
dividends from the corporation as a going concern, but, as will be
pointed out, the jurisdictions committed to the Massachusetts rule do
not.
On one phase of the broad problem of the allotment of extraordinary dividends the courts are fairly well agreed-i.e., that a dividend
which is not declared from earnings past or present, but which repre17
sents capital assets, must be awarded to corpus, rather than to income.
This would seem to be in accord with the general capital fund doctrine
in the law of corporations,' 8 and in the instant case accounts for the
award of the 5120 value of each share to trust corpus regardless of
which rule the court applied.
The allotment to the life beneficiary of the amount in excess of
$120 per share does not seem so clearly explained. Instead of investigating the source of the earnings represented by the bank's assets, the
court took judicial notice of the fact that during the period of 1929
to 1935, the banks of this country were in poor financial condition and
that this bank, like others, accumulated the greater portion of its assets after 1935, the date of the testator's death and the beginning of
the life estate. Having established in this summary manner that the
excess over $120 per share accrued subsequent to the inception of the
trust, the court could have correctly allotted it to the life beneficiary
by an application of the Pennsylvania rule. 19 However, the court appears to be mistaken as to the application of the Massachusetts rule
to this case. In states which follow that rule as to extraordinary dividends from a corporation as a going concern, it is generally held that
where the corporation sells part or all of its property, and distributes
the proceeds among its shareholders, such proceeds, when received by
the trustee, even though paid in cash, are to be allotted wholly to principal. In other words, liquidation dividends are payable entirely to
the corpus of the trust, and are not treated as other extraordinary
Philadelphia Trust Co., 18 Del. Ch. 439, 159 At. 376 (1931), where the court in
awarding part of a stock dividend to income, emphasized the point that the dividend was not in liquidation.
'DuPont v. Peyton, 15 Del. Ch. 255, 136 At. 149 (1927); Hite's Devisees v. Hite's
Ex'r, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W. 778, 19 L. R. A. 173 (1892); Gray v. Hemenway, 268 Mass.
515, 168 N. E. 1o2 (1929); In re Trust Under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 15
N. W. (2d) 590 (1944); Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 139 At. 200, 56 A. L. R. 1303
(1927); Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 29o N. W. 758, 293 N. W. 150 (1940).
IS12 Fletcher, Corporations (Perm. ed. 1932) § 5422; Stevens, Corporations (1936)
§§1o, 178, 185, 186.
"Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. St. 368 (1857); In re Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457,
139 At. 200, 56 A. L. R. 1303 (1927).
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cash dividends, even though they might, in fact, be found to represent in part accumulated earnings. 20 As the statement of facts in the instant case shows this to be a liquidation dividend, 21 it seems that a
court applying the Massachusetts rule to these facts wouild have
awarded the entire amount to the corpus of the trust and not have
awarded all accumulated earnings to income as the Kentucky court did.
When stock in a corporation constitutes a substantial portion of
a trust estate, and that corporation is liquidated, it would seem that
injustice can be avoided only by apportionment of the dividend earnings between income and corpus with reference to the value of the
stock at the inception of the life estate. The Kentucky rule usually
results in injustice to the remainderman,2 2 and the Massachusetts rule,
in the case of liquidating dividends, breaks down entirely as far as
2OBulkeley v. Worthington Ecclesiastical Society, 78 Conn. 526, 63 Atl. 351, 12
L. R. A. (N.s.) 785 (19o6); Anderson v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647, 72 A. L. R.
959 (1930) (assets liquidated included surplus); Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass.
478 (1874); 2 Scott, Trusts (1939) § 236.io; Notes (1931) 72 A. L. R. 981, 996; (1923)
24 A. L. R. 9, io6.
It is provided in § 5 (3) of the Uniform Principal and Income Act that "Where
the assets of a corporation are liquidated, amounts paid upon corporate shares as
cash dividends declared before such liquidation occurred or as arrears of preferred
or guaranteed dividends shall be deemed income; all other amounts paid upon corporate shares on disbursement of the corporate assets to the shareholders shall be
deemed principal."
In Massachusetts it has been held that a cash dividend in partial distribution
of the corporate assets which does not impair the capital will be regarded as income.
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Aymar, 317 Mass. 66, 56 N. E. (2d) 889 (1944); Creed v.
McAleer, 275 Mass. 353, 175 N. E. 761, 8o A. L. R. 1117 (1931); Gray v. Hemenway,
268 Mass. 515, 168 N. E. o02(1929); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Jameson, 256 Mass.
179, 152 N. E. 52, 5o A. L. R. 372 (1926).
21
The court states that "the Deposit Bank referred to herein decided to voluntarily liquidate its assets and discontinue the banking business, and in March of
1946, pursuant to a vote of its stockholders and directors, the entire assets of the
bank were ordered sold for distribution among its stockholders." Laurent v. Randolph, 306 Ky. 134, 206 S. W. (2d) 480, 482 (1947).
22
Apparently the court in the principal case considered the par value plus the
paid-in surplus as representing as much, if not more, than the book value of the
stock at the beginning of the life estate. Assuming this to be true, then the application of the Kentucky rule in this case is not subject to the usual criticism that
it results in a dissipation of the trust corpus, for all income did accrue during the
life estate. However, in the more typical case, a settlor who places stock in a trust
fund is inclined to use stock which he considers a stable investment, and this is
often reflected in the fact that the book value of the stock is much higher than its
par value (plus paid-in surplus, if any). If the assets of such a corporation are liquidated, and liquidating dividends are paid to the trustee, the operation of the Kentucky rule results in the payment of all of the accumulated earnings to the life
beneficiary, and strips away the intended margin of security, leaving only the
skeleton-the par value. For an extreme application of the Kentucky rule, see Hubley v. Wolfe, 259 Ky. 574, 82 S. W. (2d) 830, 1o1 A. L. R. 1359 (1935).
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apportionment is concerned, 8 with consequent injustice to the life
beneficiary. The principle of the Pennsylvania rule appears to provide
the only means of reaching a settlement fair to all parties; and should
its application become too complicated for the individual trustee, the
court of equity, with its ever-increasing ability to cope with complicated problems, stands ready at his call to provide guidance.
The Kentucky court in the principal case senses the injustices which
can arise from the operation of its rule, and thus, makes an effort to
test the result by an application of all three rules to the same facts.
Justice Knight's statement of preference for the Pennsylvania rule
may prove to be a significant straw in the wind, and at least indicates
that this court would probably not have gone to the extreme pursued
by an earlier Kentucky court 24 which considered itself so bound by
stare decisis that it applied the Kentucky rule even when the effect
was to award about four-fifths of the trust corpus to the life beneficiary. 24 It is therefore quite possible that this decision foreshadows the

ultimate death of the already weak Kentucky rule, and the adoption
by the courts of Kentucky of a view better calculated to obtain fair
and equitable results.
JAMES A. QUISENBERRY

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE-DRAFTING

OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

INCIDEN-

TAL TO BUSINESS AS PRACTICE OF LAW BY REAL ESTATE AGENCY. [Vir-

ginia]
In an effort to check the rising incidence of unauthorized practice
of law, Bar Associations are joining in a concerted postwar campaign
against unlicensed practitioners who were able to expand the scope of
their activities because of the shortage of legal manpower during the
war.1 Representative of this development is the recent effort in Virginia to check the unauthorized practice of law by real estate agencies.
Unauthorized practice controversies arising in this state are now decided under rules and regulations defining the practice of law, 2 which
=See cases cited in note 20, supra.
Ky. 574, 82 S.W. (2d) 83o, ll A. L. R. 1359 (1935).
21iUnauth.
Prac. News, Third Quarter, 37 (1945).
217,
Va. XVII "Generally, the relation of attorney and client exists, and one
is deemed to be practicing law, whenever he furnishes to another advice or service
under circumstances which imply his possession and use of legal knowledge or skill.
"Specifically, the relation of attorney and client exists, and one is deemed to
be practicing law, wheneverO(i)
one undertakes for compensation, direct or indirect, to advise an2
"Hubley v. Wolfe, 259
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were drawn up by a committee on The Integration of The Virginia
State Bar and adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals in 1938,
pursuant to legislative authority. 3 Their first application in the courts
was made in the recent decision of Commonwealth of Virginia and
The Virginia State Bar Association v. Jones & Robbins, Inc.4 The state,
at the instance of the Council of the Virginia State Bar, instituted suit
against the defendant, a real estate brokerage corporation, alleging
that the corporation habitually prepared deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages and deeds of release in connection with the sale of real estate
and closing of real estate loans, and in doing so was engaged in the
practice of law. The defendant contended that since the court's rules
defining the practice of law expressly provided that the drafting of
"contracts incidental to the regular course of conducting a licensed
business" was not within the prohibited activity, the realty company
was not guilty of illegal practice of law, as all instruments prepared
by it were incidental to its business.
The Supreme Court of Appeals in holding that the drafting of the
documents in question constituted the practice of law, rejected this
contention, pointing out that, "technically speaking, deeds of bargain
and sale, release deeds and deeds of trust (and the notes secured thereby) are 'contracts.' But they are not contracts ordinarily incident to
the business of a realtor. They are extraordinary contracts and are
muniments of title to real estate."5 The court recognized the necessity of
according protection to the public by requiring that these instruments
be prepared by lawyers who by proper training and experience are in
better position to perform this important duty.
Inasmuch as the Virginia State Bar Committee had specifically
other, not his regular employer, in any matter involving the application of
legal principles to facts or purposes or desires.
(2) One, other than a regular employee acting for his employer, undertakes, with or without compensation, to prepare for another legal instruments of any character, other than notices or contracts incident to the
regular course of conducting a licensed business.
(3)One undertakes, with or without compensation, to represent the
interest of another before any tribunal,-judicial, administrative, or executive,-otherwise than in presentation of facts, figures, or factual conclusions,
as distinguished from legal conclusions, by an employee regularly and bona
fide employed on a salary basis, or by one specially employed as an expert
in respect to such facts and figures when such preparation by such employee
or expert does not involve the examination of witnesses or preparation
of pleadings."
Wa. Acts of Assembly (1938) c. 410, p. 771.
4186 Va. 30, 41 S. E. (ad) 720 (1947).
'i86 Va. 3o, 35, 41 S. E. (ad) 720, 723 (1947).
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decided that the drafting of deeds constitutes the practice of law, the
court in the instant case had positive assurance that it was following
the intent of the framers of the rules. 6 In most cases the meaning of
the term "unauthorized practice" is not so positively determined, and
the courts must work out their own specific interpretations of a generally stated precept for application to each situation. 7 All courts are
agreed that the practice of law is to be broadly defined as covering a
wide range of activities.
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court .... In a larger sense it includes legal advice and counsel
and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not
be pending in court."8
And though lip service is paid to the idea that laymen should not be
allowed to draft legal instruments, most courts are reluctant to prohibit realtors from preparing such documents where the drafting is
incidental to the business in which they are engaged. This situation
is exemplified by In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., where the
court declared:
"....

where an instrument is to be shaped from a mass of facts

and conditions, the legal effect of which must be carefully determined by a mind trained in the existing laws in order to insure a specific result and guard against others, more than the
knowledge of the layman is required....,9
Despite this language, the court went on to decide that where such
drafting was incidental to the business in which the drafter engaged,
it did not constitute the practice of law. Though this is probably the
most common reasoning advanced for sanctioning quasi-legal practice
by realty agencies, 1° the need of protection of the public from unGSee x86 Va. 3o at 37, 41 S. E. (2d) 720 at 724.
This intention of the drafters was correctly followed, as the rules of the construction of court rules are the same as for the construction of statutes. Chiricahua
Ranches Co. v. State, 44 Ariz. 559, 39 P (2d) 640 (1934); Helbush v. Helbush, 209
Cal. 758, 290 Pac. 18 (193o).
7"... the determination of any issue that presents this question [unauthorized
practice] must be left to the facts of each particular case." Creditors' Service Corp.
v. Cummings, 57 R. I. 291, 19o At. 2, 9 (1937).
'Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, 209 N. C. 624, 184 S. E. 540, 544 (1936). Paul
v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401, 404 (1932): "A person ... does work of a
legal nature, when the instruments he prepares either define, set forth, limit, terminate, specify, claim or grant legal rights."
949 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157, 159 (1930). The court did hold that where the defendant prepared legal instruments for the public, it was the practice of law.
"In re Loeb, Si5 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943); Cowem v. Nelson, 207
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authorized practice seems the same whether the realtor drafts the instrument as incidental to his business or as an independent service to
anyone who might care to employ him to draw up legal documents."1
Other contentions have been advanced by the realty companies to
justify the drafting of legal instruments, but the legal profession has
sought to persuade the courts that business expediency should not be
12
held to legalize the practice of law by non-lawyers.
The contention that real estate agencies should be allowed to
write simple instruments, where such are ancilliary to the business in
which they are engaged, while accepted by some courts, was adequately
refuted by Judge Pound in his concurring opinion in People v. Title
Guarantee and Trust Co.:
". I am unable to rest any satisfactory test on the distinction
between simple and complex instruments. The most complex
are simple to3 the skilled, and the simplest often trouble the inexperienced."'
The similar argument of the realtors that no unauthorized practice is involved in merely filling in blank spaces on standard forms was
repudiated by the Ohio court in In re Gore:
"The selecting, by a real estate broker, of the appropriate form
of contract blank for others or the filling out of such blank by
others, in the furtherance of a real estate transaction, constitutes
the practice of law, and such person must be duly licensed to
practice law to legally perform such acts."' 4
The discretion exercised to choose the correct blank to use in a particular transaction may require as much knowledge of the law as is required to draft a complete instrument. The realtor is in effect giving
Minn 642, 290 N. W. 795 (1940); People v. Title Guarantee and Trust Co., 227 N.
Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666 (1919); Cain v. Merchants National Bank and Trust Co. of
Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719 (1936); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 Ad.
883 (1934).
In the following cases this contention was made but was rejected by the court:
Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co. of Louisville, 303 Ky. 493, 197 S. W. (2d) 454 (1946);
In re Gore, 58 Ohio App. 79, 15 N. E. (2d) 968 (1937); R. I. Bar Ass'n v. Automobile
Service Ass'n, 55 R. I. 122, 179 At. 139 (1935); Hexter Title and Abstract Co., Inc.
v. Grievance Committee, Fifth Congressional District, State Bar of Texas, 142 Tex.
5o6, 179 S. W. (2d) 946 (1944); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401 (1932).
"13 Unauth. Prac. News, Third Quarter, 5 (1947).
"Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar (1938) 5 Law. and Contemp. Prob. 66.
2227 N. Y. 366, 125 N. E. 666, 670 (1919). The majority of the court held that
where the preparation of legal instruments was ancillary to the everyday business
in which the drafter was engaged, it was not the practice of law.
2158 Ohio App. 79, i5 N. E. (2d) 968 (1937).
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advice in choosing the correct form to carry out the legal purpose desired by the parties.' 5 The language to be used to carry out the intent
of the parties in creating various interests in land is extremely technical, and comprehension of it can be acquired only through intensive
study. It cannot be picked up casually by real estate agents in the
course of their business activities.
The distinction made by some courts16 in saying that drafting instruments does not constitute practice of law unless consideration
passes for the service is entirely unconvincing. As stated by one court:
"... It might as well be said that a surgeon who performs, witha tonsillectomy or appendectomy is not pracout fee or reward,
17
ticing surgery.'
In the first place, it is impossible in many cases to determine whether
any charge is made for drafting. In most real estate transactions a percentage commission is charged, and there is no means of proving that
this fee does not also include the cost of drafting the necessary instruments. This problem becomes even more intricate when intangible
forms of consideration come into play. The Wisconsin Bar Association
recently notified bankers of that state that "consideration" might be
so strictly construed as to make the good will gained through the preparation of legal instruments sufficient consideration to make such drafting the illegal practice of law.' 8
Furthermore, the "consideration" test misses the main point in
restricting the practice to trained lawyers. The purpose of preventing
laymen from writing legal instruments is not to protect the legal profession as a closed shop, but to protect the public from unskilled and
unreliable practitioners.' 9 The losses likely to arise from employing un"113 Unauth. Prac. News, Third Quarter, 5 (1947).
"Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N. W. 795 (1940); Cain v. Merchants
National Bank and Trust Co. of Fargo, 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719 (1936); Childs
v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 At. 883 (1934); Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 12 P.

(2d) 401 (1932).
'7State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 379, 268 N. W. 95, 96 (1936). See also
Hexter Title and Abstract Co. Inc. v. Greivance Committee, Fifth Congressional
District, State Bar of Texas, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S. W: (2d) 946, 952 (1944).
Unauth. Prac. News, Second Quarter, 27 (1946).
""The gravity of the consequences to society resulting from abuses of this relation demands that those assuming to advise or to represent others shall be properly
trained and educated, and be subject to a peculiar discipline. That fact, and the
necessity for protection of society in its affairs and in the ordered proceedings of
its tribunals, have developed the principles which serve to define the practice of
law." 171 Va. XVII.
"It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
1812

19481
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authorized practitioners go far beyond the mere waste of fees paid;
much more significant are the losses arising from failure to obtain the
legal rights which were intended to be secured but which were in fact
20
lost through faulty preparation of the documents.
In rebuttal, the real estate agencies point out that they also must
be licensed by the state, and in some instances are required to show
their fitness to engage in the real estate business. 21 However, it can hardly be argued that these statutory standards are such as to assure that
the realtor will be competent to engage in practices which require the
skill of a person with legal training.
Furthermore, the realtor's self-interest in completing the transaction so as to obtain his commission may, consciously or unconsciously,
outweigh his concern for protecting the interests of vendee or vendor. 22
The construction which may be put on the instrument by a court years
thereafter is in no way connected with his duty to his principal, which
23
ends when the deal is closed.
The saving to clients has been pointed out as another reason why
realtors should be allowed to do all the work necessary to complete the
transaction between the parties. However, to the average man the purchase of a home is the most important real estate transaction of a lifetime. A small extra cost at the outset for competent legal services is of
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligation to clients which
rests on attorneys." In re Opinion of The Justices, 289 Mass. 6o7, 194 N. E. 313,
317 (1935).
'"It was a matter of common knowledge among the members of the bar and
the judges of our courts that many deeds which had been prepared by real estate
agents and other laymen were defective and often resulted in costly litigation. This
no doubt was due to the fact that most of these parties did not know or appreciate
the legal effect of a deed. Titles to real property at times have been upset and in
some cases the owner either lost his property or was compelled to fight a costly lawsuit all because of a defective deed prepared by an untrained layman." Commonwealth v. Jones & Robbins, Inc., 186 Va. 30, 36, 41 S.E. (2d) 720, 724 (1947).
21
E.g., N. Y. Stat. (1935) c. 16o, Subd. 1 (d).
'2Houck, Drafting of Real Estate Instruments: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Bar (1938) 5 Law and Contemp. Prob. 66, 71.
21"He [the real estate dealer] owes no affirmative duty to his client, is not liable
to him for negligence or failure, and may recede from his employment at will, without notice." Carsten v. McReavy, i Wash. 359, 25 Pac. 471 (1890).
It is in no sense necessary for the realtor to draft the instrument which consummates the dealings of the parties: "Courts almost unanimously unite in holding
that in case of an ordinary employment to sell, when he has procured a party
able and willing to buy, upon terms demanded by his principal, and has notified
him of the purchaser's readiness to buy, the agent's work is ended and he is entitled to his commission." 25 Pac. 471. See also Halsey v. Monteiro, 92 Va. 581, 583,
24 S.E. 258, 259 (1896).
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slight significance compared to the ultimate loss which might result
from a faultily drawn deed.
Though none of these arguments for justifying the doing of quasilegal work by realtors is convincing, various courts have on occasion
been favorably influenced by them. The attempts of Bar Associations
to serve as enforcement agencies to prosecute unauthorized practitioners
has been rendered ineffectual by this lack of a clear understanding
among courts as to what constitutes the practice of law. Further, such
policing duties have embarrassed the legal profession because the appearance is created that actions of the bar are motivated by the selfish
desire to maintain a monopoly in rendering quasi-legal services. On
the other hand, legislative attempts to codify the scope of permitted
and prohibited activities result in vague definitions which require interpretation by the courts. The constructions placed upon the general
precepts may bring about the desired result as in Commonwealth of
Virginia and The Virginia State Bar Association v. Jones & Robbins:
Inc., but may just as often bring about the opposite result. Attempts
have been made in several states to draw up agreements between Bar
Associations and Real Estate Associations, limiting the scope of the
activities of each group to their particular fields. A recent survey indicates, however, that this plan has met with only limited success.2 4
Legislatures, courts and Bar Associations can, at best, furnish only
piecemeal answers to the problem of unauthorized practice. The ultimate solution must lie in education of members of the public to an
understanding that it is to their interest to have fully qualified legal
practitioners render these services. The legal profession can promote
this understanding by maintaining such high standards of service to
clients that it becomes obvious that the small initial cost is far more
than offset by the advantage of greater assurance in the validity of the
instruments prepared.
HENRY C. CLARK

413 Unauth. Prac. News, Second Quarter, 20 (1947).
In this survey conducted
by the Washington State Bar Ass'n, of the four states reporting agreements, one
state (New Jersey) reported its agreement was only partly successful, two (Oregon
& Pennsylvania) reported theirs had been unsuccessful, and one (Wisconsin) reported theirs had been helpful.

